GR L 5514; (May, 1952) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-5514 May 7, 1952
Pedro Calano, petitioner-appellant, vs. Pedro Cruz, respondent-appellee.
FACTS
Petitioner Pedro Calano filed a quo warranto complaint in the Court of First Instance of Bataan against respondent Pedro Cruz, challenging Cruz’s proclamation as a duly elected councilor of Orion, Bataan. The complaint was filed on November 23, 1951, which was the eighth day after the proclamation. The last day of the seven-day period prescribed by Section 173 of the Revised Election Code was November 22, 1951, which had been declared a “Special Public Holiday for National Thanksgiving” by presidential proclamation. The trial court dismissed the complaint on two grounds: (1) the petition was filed beyond the seven-day statutory period, and (2) the petitioner lacked legal capacity to sue because his complaint did not allege that he was duly elected councilor and was deprived of the position by Cruz’s proclamation.
ISSUE
1. Whether the complaint was filed out of time, considering the holiday.
2. Whether the complaint was properly dismissed on the ground that the petitioner had no legal capacity to sue.
RULING
1. On the timeliness of the complaint: The Supreme Court reversed the trial court, holding that the complaint was filed within the allowable period. Even assuming that Section 1 of Rule 28 of the Rules of Court (regarding computation of time) did not apply to election cases, Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code governed. This provision states that when the last day for doing an act required by law falls on a holiday, the act may be done on the next succeeding business day. Since November 22, 1951, was a holiday, filing on November 23, 1951, was timely.
2. On the legal capacity to sue: The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground that the petitioner had no legal capacity to sue. The defense of “lack of legal capacity to sue” refers to personal disqualifications such as minority, insanity, coverture, or lack of juridical personality, not to the failure of the complaint to state a sufficient cause of action. The alleged deficiency in the complaint—that it contained conclusions of law rather than factual allegations (e.g., that Calano obtained the next highest number of votes)—pertained to the sufficiency of the cause of action, a ground not raised in the motion to dismiss. Therefore, dismissal on this basis was improper.
The order of dismissal was reversed, and the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
