G.R. No. L-55130. January 17, 1983.
Pedro Santos To, petitioner, vs. Hon. Ernani Cruz-Paño, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch XVIII, and Juan Y. Ocampo, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Pedro Santos To was convicted of estafa for issuing a bouncing check. The trial court sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of seven years and eight months to nine years and four months of prision mayor. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reduced the penalty to one year and one day to one year and eight months of prision correccional. After this decision became final, petitioner filed a petition for probation.
The Probation Office recommended approval of the petition. However, the respondent judge denied it, citing two grounds: first, that granting probation would depreciate the seriousness of the offense of issuing bouncing checks, and second, that petitioner was not a penitent offender because he had protested his innocence through his appeal. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was also denied, prompting this petition.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in denying the petition for probation based on the stated grounds.

RULING

Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition and set aside the denial, declaring petitioner eligible for probation. The legal logic is anchored on a proper interpretation of Presidential Decree No. 968, the Probation Law. The law expressly enumerates disqualifications under Section 9, such as those sentenced to a maximum term exceeding six years, those convicted of crimes against national security, and recidivists. Petitioner, a first-time offender whose reduced sentence fell below the six-year threshold, was not among the disqualified.
The Court found the respondent judge’s reasons legally insufficient. The first reason—that probation would depreciate the seriousness of the offense—erroneously focused on the nature of the crime rather than the offender, which contravenes the rehabilitative purpose of probation. The law uses the penalty imposed, not the crime’s nature (except for national security crimes), as the primary criterion. To disqualify all estafa-by-check offenders would impermissibly add a new disqualification not found in the law.
The second reason—that petitioner was not penitent due to his appeal—was also erroneous. Filing an appeal is a statutory right and does not demonstrate lack of repentance. Petitioner’s successful appeal, which reduced his penalty to within the probationable range, actually enabled his application. His subsequent immediate filing for probation, instead of pursuing a further appeal, indicated his acceptance of the judgment and desire for rehabilitation. The Probation Law should be applied liberally to achieve its reformative purpose, as held in Balleta Jr. vs. Hon. Leviste. The Solicitor General’s recommendation to grant probation bolstered this conclusion.