G.R. No. L-54881 July 31, 1984
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RODOLFO QUIBATE, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

The accused-appellant, Rodolfo Quibate, was convicted of parricide for stabbing his wife, Prima Baltar-Quibate, to death on July 22, 1978, in President Roxas, Capiz. The prosecution evidence established that the killing occurred during a quarrel arising from the appellant’s jealousy. Their ten-year-old daughter, Imelda Quibate, witnessed the stabbing. The appellant was apprehended at the scene still holding the knife. The defense of self-defense was rejected by the trial court as not credible. The marriage between the appellant and the deceased was sufficiently proven through a marriage contract and testimonial evidence, despite a variance in the appellant’s first name on the document.
The pivotal procedural issue arose from the trial court’s actions post-judgment. On March 4, 1980, the court promulgated a decision sentencing Quibate to an indeterminate penalty. Immediately after, the court motu proprio cancelled this promulgation, citing the absence of counsel, the accused’s refusal to sign the receipt, a typographical error in the penalty, and that the decision had not been filed. After several resettings, a new decision imposing the heavier penalty of reclusion perpetua was promulgated on June 13, 1980. The appellant contended that by returning to jail after the March 4 promulgation without appealing, he had begun serving his sentence, making that initial judgment final and the subsequent modified promulgation void.

ISSUE

The core issue is whether the trial court validly cancelled the initial promulgation of March 4, 1980, and subsequently promulgated a modified decision, or whether this act violated the rule on finality of judgment and constituted double jeopardy.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction for parricide but modified the penalty. The Court held that the trial court’s cancellation of the March 4, 1980 promulgation was valid. A judgment becomes final only after the lapse of the period to appeal, and the court retains control over its decisions before finality to correct clerical errors or nunc pro tunc amendments. The cited grounds for cancellation—the absence of counsel, the accused’s refusal to acknowledge receipt, and a patent error in the penalty imposed—were substantial and justified the court’s corrective action before the judgment attained finality. The subsequent promulgation on June 13, 1980, which corrected the penalty to the statutory penalty for parricide, was therefore valid.
However, on the constitutional question of double jeopardy, the Court ruled in favor of the appellant. The principle that a judgment becomes final upon the defendant’s commencement of service of sentence is pivotal. The records indicated that after the March 4 promulgation, the appellant was committed to jail and did not appeal. This act of being detained under the first sentence constituted commencement of service. Consequently, the initial judgment became final after the 15-day appeal period lapsed. Any substantial modification thereafter, especially an increase in penalty, would place the appellant in double jeopardy. Therefore, while the conviction stands, the appellant is entitled to serve the lighter indeterminate sentence (12 years minimum to 17 years maximum) imposed in the initial March 4, 1980 decision, as it had already become final.