G.R. No. L-5422; March 31, 1952
FELIX T. CARO, petitioner,

vs.
SILVINO M. GUMPAL ET AL., respondents.

FACTS

On November 26, 1951, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Isabela proclaimed Felix T. Caro as the elected governor with 14,948 votes. The second placer, Silvino M. Gumpal, who obtained 14,858 votes, filed an election protest on December 10 of the same year. The third placer, Melanio T. Singson, who obtained 14,423 votes, filed a motion for intervention (tercería) in the election protest proceedings initiated by Gumpal, setting the hearing of said motion for January 12, 1952. On that day, Felix T. Caro and the protestant Gumpal opposed the motion for intervention and the admission of the answer in intervention filed by Singson, arguing that the motion was filed out of time. The hearing was postponed to the next scheduled date, January 19, on which day protestant Gumpal withdrew his opposition. After considering the parties’ arguments, the Court of First Instance ruled that the two-week period for filing a petition for intervention should be counted from the date of the filing of the answer to the protest. Since the answer was filed on January 7, 1952, the judge granted the motion for intervention and admitted the answer in intervention, which had been filed on January 8 of that month, which was the forty-third day after the proclamation of the election result. The motion for reconsideration filed by Caro was denied, prompting him to file this petition for avocation (certiorari) with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of First Instance acted in excess of its jurisdiction in admitting the motion for intervention and the answer in intervention filed by the third-placer, Melanio T. Singson, beyond the two-week period prescribed by the Revised Election Code.

RULING

The Supreme Court granted the petition and declared null and void the lower court’s order admitting the answer in intervention. The Court held that the provision of Section 176(g) of the Revised Election Code is clear and requires no interpretation. It states that other defeated candidates may, within the period fixed for protesting, intervene in the matter as other protestants and ask for affirmative relief in their favor through a protest in intervention (protesta en tercería), which shall be treated as another protest but heard within the same record. Their intervention is not authorized in any other manner. The Court reasoned that since the original protestant must file his protest within two weeks after the proclamation of the election result, as per Section 174, the intervenor, who is also another protestant, should not be given a longer period. To allow a longer period (43 days in this case) would be unjust and contrary to public policy. The legislature fixed the two-week period to ensure a definite time for ending all claims regarding the election result; otherwise, political animosities from electoral contests would be endless. The period must be equal for all—both for the protestant and the intervenor—as they pursue the same end: to be declared the elected governor. Citing the precedent in Delizo vs. Judge de los Santos (81 Phil. 361), the Supreme Court reiterated that Courts of First Instance, although courts of general jurisdiction, exercise special and limited jurisdiction in election matters as conferred by the special law, the Revised Election Code. Therefore, they cannot take cognizance of a protest or an intervention in a protest unless the corresponding pleading is filed within the two-week period from the day of the proclamation by the board of canvassers. The circumstance that the protestant did not oppose or even consented to the motion for intervention does not confer jurisdiction upon the court, as jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by the Election Law, not by the conformity, assent, or silence of a party. Costs were imposed on the intervenor-respondent Singson.