G.R. No. L-53837, October 3, 1991
Felix Painaga, petitioner, vs. Hon. Noli Ma. Cortes, Court of First Instance of Antique (Branch I) and Venancio V. Mostacho, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Felix Painaga purchased a parcel of land in 1962 and has been in possession since. In 1977, private respondent Venancio Mostacho, claiming a portion of that land was included in his Original Certificate of Title (OCT) derived from a free patent, caused a technical survey over petitioner’s opposition. Petitioner filed a sworn protest with the District Land Officer, seeking annulment of the title on the ground of fraud, and an investigation commenced.
Subsequently, petitioner filed an action for Injunction with Damages in the Court of First Instance. He alleged that since filing the administrative protest, private respondent and his agents had repeatedly attempted to oust him from the contested area through force, violence, and intimidation. He sought a writ of preliminary injunction to protect his possession pending the administrative proceedings.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court correctly dismissed the civil action for injunction on the ground of prematurity due to non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.

RULING

No. The trial court misapplied the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. It erroneously characterized the injunction suit as an action for the annulment of private respondent’s title, which was the subject of the pending Bureau of Lands protest. A reading of the complaint reveals it is fundamentally a possessory action to protect petitioner’s prior physical possession from alleged acts of force and intimidation.
The Supreme Court clarified that the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands is primarily confined to determining rights over the disposition and alienation of public lands. In contrast, the regular courts retain jurisdiction over possessory actions, the purpose of which is to protect actual occupants and prevent breaches of peace, regardless of the question of ownership. The relief sought in the injunction case—protection of possession—is distinct from the relief sought in the administrative protest—cancellation of title and determination of ownership. A decision in the possessory action would not encroach upon the Bureau of Lands’ primary jurisdiction over the ownership issue.
The case is distinguishable from Pestanas vs. Dyogi, cited by the trial court, where the court action sought the identical relief of nullifying a free patent, which was already pending in the administrative forum. Here, the causes of action and the reliefs sought are different. Therefore, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not bar the civil action for injunction. The order of dismissal was annulled, and the case was reinstated for trial.