G.R. No. L-53798 November 8, 1988
ALBERTO C. ROXAS and NENITA DE GUIA, petitioners, vs. MARINA BUAN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ZAMBALES, BRANCH 1 AND THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF ZAMBALES THRU HIS DEPUTY, ATILANO G. NANQUIL, respondents.

FACTS

Arcadio Valentin mortgaged a house and lot to Marina Buan. Upon Valentin’s default, Buan extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage, purchased the property at the auction sale, and, after the redemption period expired, obtained a final deed of sale. When Valentin failed to vacate, Buan filed a petition for a writ of possession in the Court of First Instance of Zambales. The court granted the petition, ordering the sheriff to remove Valentin or any person claiming under him and to place Buan in possession.
During execution, the sheriff found petitioners Alberto Roxas and Nenita de Guia occupying the property. Roxas claimed he bought the property from Valentin for P100,000.00 and introduced improvements. Buan moved to have them cited for contempt for disobeying the writ. The trial court dismissed the contempt petition, recognizing petitioners were not parties to the original case. However, in the same order, it directed petitioners to vacate the property within fifteen days. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, arguing the writ of possession was ineffective against them as third-party claimants, and that Buan must file a separate action. The motion was denied.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering petitioners, who were not parties to the foreclosure suit, to vacate the property based on the writ of possession issued in favor of the foreclosure sale purchaser.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, ruling no grave abuse of discretion attended the lower court’s order. The legal logic is anchored on the nature of a writ of possession in extrajudicial foreclosure and the status of the petitioners. Under Section 6 of Act No. 3135, as amended, the purchaser at a foreclosure sale is entitled to a writ of possession, as an incident of ownership, after the redemption period expires. This entitlement is implemented under Section 35, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which allows issuance unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor.
The Court found petitioners were not such adverse third parties. Roxas, claiming to have purchased the property from the judgment debtor Valentin after the foreclosure, merely stepped into the shoes of Valentin as a successor-in-interest. His only conceivable interest was the now-expired right of redemption. His possession was therefore not adverse to Valentin but derived from him. De Guia, as Roxas’s alleged tenant, held under the same derivative claim. Consequently, petitioners fell under the writ’s directive to remove “any person claiming interest under” Valentin. A separate action against them was unnecessary. The purchaser’s right to possession under a writ is recognized against the judgment debtor and his successors, but not against persons with a title adverse to the debtor. Since petitioners’ claim was not adverse to the debtor’s title but derived from it, the writ was properly enforced against them without a violation of due process.