G.R. No. L-5256
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EUSTASIO HERNANDEZ, ET AL., defendant-appellants.
December 21, 1909

FACTS:
Eustasio Hernandez and Catalina Mago were charged with adultery in the Court of First Instance of Ambos Camarines. Both were convicted and sentenced to prision correccional. Hernandez admitted to the illicit relations but raised the defense that Mariano del Pilar, Catalina Mago’s husband and the complainant, had consented to the adulterous acts. The trial court found the evidence presented by the defendants insufficient to prove such consent. The defendants appealed the conviction to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
1. Did the trial court err in finding the evidence for the alleged consent of the offended spouse insufficient?
2. More importantly, would the consent of the offended spouse to the adulterous acts be a valid defense to a charge of adultery?

RULING:
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction.

1. The Court found no reason to disturb the trial court’s conclusion that the evidence adduced by the defendants was insufficient to sustain the allegation of consent. The evidence fully supported the lower court’s finding.
2. Although not strictly necessary for the decision of this case given the finding on the insufficiency of evidence, the Court stated, for future guidance, that even if the consent of the offended spouse had been obtained, such consent would not be a valid defense in an adultery action. The Court explained that Act No. 1773 materially changed the substantive criminal law relating to adultery, making it a “public crime” (with specified exceptions). This Act entirely abolished the right of condonation, pardon, and remission of penalty, and by necessary implication, abrogated the defense that the injured spouse had consented to the commission of the adulterous acts. The legislative intent in changing private crimes into public crimes was to remove from injured persons all control over the criminal liability of offenders, preventing any remission of criminal responsibility, whether occurring before or after the crime. Public interest dictates that no person can negate the legal effect of a crime by consenting to its commission.