G.R. No. L-5155 February 16, 1953
TARCELA R. VDA. DE BOUGH, ETC., plaintiff-appellant, vs. ESTEBAN, SERAFIN and REMEDIOS, all surnamed SINGZON, defendant-appellees.

FACTS

On September 16, 1948, the plaintiff, Tarcela R. Vda. de Bough, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Leyte to recover damages totaling P200,000 from the defendants, Esteban, Serafin, and Remedios Singzon. The damages arose from the defendants’ alleged unlawful possession of three parcels of land belonging to the plaintiff from 1928 to September 2, 1947. The defendants filed an amended motion to dismiss the complaint on October 13, 1948, on the grounds that it failed to state a cause of action, or if it did, that the cause of action had prescribed or was premature due to lack of prior demand. On October 25, 1948, the trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the action had prescribed under section 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure, whether viewed as an action to recover damages for taking personal property or for damages from trespass on real estate. The plaintiff appealed. The three parcels of land had been the subject of a prior registration proceeding where the plaintiff’s deceased husband, Irving Gustavus Bough, was the applicant and the defendants were oppositors. The Court of First Instance decided in favor of the applicant, a decision affirmed by the Court of Appeals on February 5, 1942. The plaintiff contended that her cause of action accrued only on March 10, 1945, when Leyte was officially declared free from enemy control, as her deceased husband, an American citizen considered an enemy alien during the Japanese occupation, could only file a complaint then. She argued it was premature to bring an action for damages before the final termination of the registration proceeding that settled ownership.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff’s action for damages had prescribed in its entirety.

RULING

Yes, the trial court erred. The Supreme Court reversed the appealed order and remanded the case for further proceedings. While the Court did not agree with the plaintiff’s contention that an action for damages was premature during the pendency of the registration proceeding (as ownership was not contingent on the finality of that decision), it held that the trial court erred in finding the entire action had prescribed. Assuming the applicability of section 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure (prescribing a four-year period), damages caused within the prescriptive period prior to the filing of the complaint on September 16, 1948, were still recoverable. The damages alleged from the defendants’ unlawful possession were divisible from year to year, even though they arose from a continuing act. Therefore, the prescription did not bar the totality of the claim, only those damages incurred outside the four-year prescriptive period. The case was remanded for further proceedings without costs.