G.R. No. L-51216. June 30, 1987.
AGATON T. LANDICHO and LUCENA M. LANDICHO, petitioners, vs. HON. RICARDO P. TENSUAN, Judge, CFI of Rizal, Br. IV; HON. MINERVA C. GENOVEA, formerly Presiding Judge, City Court of Quezon City, Br. 1, now CFI Judge of Bulacan, Br. I, Malolos; HON. REMIGIO SARI, Presiding Judge, City Court of Quezon City, Branch VII; LEONIDA ASERON, represented by her Guardian Ad Litem, Spouses ILDEFONSO ASERON and LEONOR ESMERALDA ASERON, respondents.

FACTS

Private respondent Leonida Aseron filed an ejectment case against petitioners in the City Court of Quezon City. The court ruled in favor of Aseron, ordering the petitioners to vacate the premises and pay accrued rentals and attorney’s fees. Petitioners appealed to the Court of First Instance (CFI), which affirmed the city court’s decision in toto. Within the reglementary period, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and an appeal bond. Private respondents opposed, contending the proper remedy was a petition for review, not an ordinary appeal. The CFI, presided by respondent Judge Ricardo Tensuan, dismissed the appeal on July 2, 1979, ruling it was an improper remedy. Consequently, as the period for appeal had lapsed, petitioners moved for execution of judgment, which the trial court granted on July 24, 1979.
Petitioners then filed the instant petition for certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and preliminary injunction, impleading several judges and challenging the dismissal of their appeal and the underlying ejectment judgment. During the pendency of this petition, petitioners voluntarily vacated the subject premises but insisted on proceeding with the case. The Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order against the enforcement of the writ of execution.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of First Instance committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petitioners’ appeal from its decision affirming the city court’s ejectment judgment.

RULING

No, the CFI did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The legal logic is clear: under Section 45 of the Judiciary Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 6031 , and reiterated in Section 22 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, a decision of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) in an appealed case that originally fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of an inferior court (Municipal or City Court) is not subject to an ordinary appeal via record on appeal and notice of appeal. The correct remedy is a petition for review. Therefore, respondent Judge Tensuan correctly dismissed the petitioners’ improperly interposed ordinary appeal.
The Court further held that petitioners resorted to this extraordinary remedy of certiorari only after losing their right to the proper appeal, which is not permissible. The other issues raised by petitioners were essentially factual, such as the validity of their consignation of rentals with a presidential assistant’s office instead of with the court or a bank as required by law (Article 1258, Civil Code, and Batas Pambansa Blg. 25), over which the Supreme Court cannot re-evaluate in this proceeding. The factual findings of the lower courts, which conclusively established petitioners’ delinquency in rental payments and refusal to recognize the new owner, are binding. Since the judgment had become final and executory, the issuance of the writ of execution was proper. The temporary restraining order was dissolved.