G.R. No. L-51154 October 18, 1979
METRO DRUG CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON. EUGENIO I. SAGMIT, Regional Director, Regional Office No. V, Ministry of Labor, RODRIGO PETILOS and PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF ALBAY, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Metro Drug Corporation filed a report with the Regional Office concerning the preventive suspension of its employee, respondent Rodrigo Petilos, for alleged stock shortages. Petilos separately filed a complaint for emergency living allowance. The petitioner submitted its Position Paper, but it was misfiled in the living allowance case instead of the termination case. Respondent Regional Director, believing no Position Paper was filed, issued an Order on October 20, 1978, directing Petilos’s reinstatement with back wages. The petitioner received a copy of this Order only on May 5, 1979, due to an office clerk’s error. The petitioner then filed a Motion for New Trial/Reconsideration, citing newly discovered evidence of additional alleged misappropriations by Petilos. This motion was denied. The petitioner subsequently filed a Memorandum of Appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The Regional Director dismissed the appeal as filed out of time and without merit, and also ruled that the NLRC was not the proper reviewing body. A Writ of Execution was issued.

ISSUE

Whether the Regional Director acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petitioner’s appeal and in the proceedings leading to the reinstatement order.

RULING

Yes, the Supreme Court found the Petition meritorious. The legal logic rests on two primary grounds: denial of due process and the timely filing of the appeal. First, the petitioner was denied due process. The Regional Director’s Order was based solely on the employee’s Position Paper, as the employer’s Position Paper was misfiled. Crucially, the case was never set for a hearing for the reception of evidence, which deprived the petitioner of its right to present its justification for the preventive suspension. This procedural lapse constituted a violation of fundamental fairness.
Second, the appeal was filed on time. The petitioner received the October 20, 1978 Order on May 5, 1979. It filed a Motion for Reconsideration on May 11, 1979, which was denied on June 28, 1979. The appeal was filed on July 2, 1979. Deducting the period during which the motion was pending, the appeal was perfected on the tenth day, complying with the applicable Policy Instructions No. 4, not the superseded rule cited by the respondent. While the appeal was erroneously directed to the NLRC instead of the Minister of Labor, this was a mere technicality that should not have been a bar; the records should have been forwarded to the proper authority.
Given the absence of evidence in the record due to the lack of a hearing, the Supreme Court deemed a remand to the Minister of Labor futile. Instead, it ordered the case remanded to the Regional Office for the proper reception of evidence from both parties on the merits of the suspension. The Restraining Order was made permanent.