GR L 51101; (May, 1988) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-51101 May 28, 1988
RUFINO NAZARETH, DOMINGO NAZARETH, ROMANA ANIANA VDA. DE FERRERA and CESAR FERRERA, petitioners, vs. RENATO S. SANTOS, and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS
Private respondent Renato Santos filed an amended complaint for accounting against petitioners before the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR). Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 946, the parties submitted their respective affidavits to constitute their direct testimonies. A hearing was set for July 28, 1978. On that date, petitioners, except one, appeared with a written motion from their counsel requesting a resetting. The motion cited counsel’s appointment as counsel de officio in a criminal case and his duty as a witness in a separate civil case scheduled for the same day.
The trial court denied the motion for postponement. It issued an order denying the resetting, terminating the cross-examination of the plaintiff, deeming the plaintiff’s right to cross-examine defendants as waived, admitting the exhibits offered, and considering the defendants’ affidavit as their direct testimony. Consequently, the case was submitted for decision based on the plaintiff’s evidence. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, praying for an opportunity to present evidence, was also denied. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s orders.
ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in affirming the trial court’s denial of petitioners’ motion for postponement and its subsequent order submitting the case for decision.
RULING
The Supreme Court found no reversible error. The denial of the motion for postponement was justified under Section 17 of P.D. 946, which explicitly states that the absence of counsel is not a ground for postponement provided they were duly notified. Counsel had been duly notified and had previously agreed to the hearing date. The plea was made on the very day of the hearing and could not rely on judicial liberality, especially given the finding by the lower courts that petitioners had engaged in dilatory tactics, having failed to appear at several prior scheduled hearings despite warnings.
Since the denial of the postponement was proper, the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in rejecting petitioners’ subsequent motion to adduce evidence. Petitioners failed to indicate the meritorious nature of their defense in both the trial and appellate courts. The case being one for accounting, which primarily involves documentary evidence, they offered no compelling reason to warrant further delay. Furthermore, the trial court possessed the inherent authority to consider the case submitted for decision to prevent further obstruction of the proceedings. The Supreme Court emphasized that a plaintiff is equally entitled to speedy justice. The petition was denied, and the case was remanded for resolution on the merits.
