GR L 51; (February, 1946) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-51; February 1, 1946 (Resolution: February 23, 1946)
VICTORIA LICHAUCO, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MANUEL GUASH, defendant-appellant.
FACTS
Plaintiff Victoria Lichauco filed an action for forcible entry in the Municipal Court of Manila against defendant Manuel Guash. She alleged that Guash, without her knowledge or consent and taking advantage of the past emergency (presumably WWII), entered, occupied, and took possession of the premises at No. 1406 Avenida Rizal, Manila, and illegally detained it despite repeated demands to vacate. She claimed damages of P200 monthly from February 1945 due to this illegal detainer. The Municipal Court rendered judgment against Guash, ordering restitution of the premises and payment of a monthly rental of P100 from March 1, 1945, until restitution. Guash appealed to the Court of First Instance (CFI), where he filed an answer containing only a general denial of the complaint’s allegations. Lichauco moved for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 35, Section 10, arguing the answer did not tender an issue. The CFI, presided by Judge Arsenio P. Dizon, granted the motion and rendered judgment ordering Guash to vacate the premises and pay P100 monthly from March 1, 1945, until vacating. Guash appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
1. Whether the trial court erred in rendering judgment on the pleadings.
2. Whether the trial court erred in trying the case without due notice to the defendant or his counsel.
3. Whether the trial court erred in rendering judgment against the defendant.
RULING
1. On the first assignment of error: The Supreme Court held that the trial court correctly rendered judgment on the pleadings regarding the defendant’s liability for illegal detainer. Under Rule 9, Section 8, material averments in the complaint (other than the amount of damage) are deemed admitted if not specifically denied. Guash’s answer was a mere general denial that did not specifically deal with each material allegation or set forth the substance of matters supporting his denial, as required by Rule 9, Section 7. Therefore, the allegations that Guash entered and occupied the premises without plaintiff’s knowledge and consent and was illegally detaining it were deemed admitted. However, the amount of damage claimed (P200 monthly) was not deemed admitted under the rules. Consequently, while judgment on the pleadings was proper for the restitution of the premises, it was error for the trial court to award damages (termed as rental) of P100 monthly without any proof as to the amount. The CFI could not rely on the Municipal Court’s finding because a perfected appeal vacates the inferior court’s judgment and requires a trial de novo in the CFI.
2. On the second assignment of error: The Supreme Court found it untenable. When a party is entitled to and asks for judgment on the pleadings, no trial is necessary; thus, notice of trial is not required.
3. On the third assignment of error: This was a consequence of the first and required no separate discussion.
Disposition and Resolution on Motion for Reconsideration:
In its initial decision dated February 1, 1946, the Supreme Court, by a majority vote, modified the CFI judgment by eliminating the portion ordering Guash to pay P100 monthly, affirming the rest (restitution and costs). The Court was divided on whether to remand the case for proof of damages or to deny damages entirely. Upon Lichauco’s motion for reconsideration (noting that Guash had admitted in his Municipal Court answer that the premises rented for P30 or P35 monthly in 1941 and that P200 was excessive), and her manifestation of willingness to accept P35 monthly, the Supreme Court, in a Resolution dated February 23, 1946, amended its dispositive part. By a majority, it modified the CFI judgment by reducing the monthly rental award to P35 from March 1, 1945, until Guash vacates the premises, affirming the judgment in all other respects, with costs against Guash in all three instances. The Court reasoned that Guash could not complain about paying an amount he himself had alleged as reasonable, and justice was served by this modification without need for remand.
