G.R. No. L-5089 May 15, 1953
Juan Mortos, petitioner, vs. Victor Ello and Lt. Oscar Gonzales, respondents.

FACTS

Victor Ello’s jeep was stolen on October 2, 1947, in Tambo, Parañaque, Rizal. On October 28, 1947, it was found in the possession of Juan Mortos in Lucena, Quezon, from whom Ello recovered the jeep through Lt. Oscar Gonzales of the Military Police. Mortos had bought the vehicle from Marcelino Felipe, Vicente Santos Pañganiban, and Alejandro Gregorio, one of whom posed as Victor Ello. On November 18, 1947, Mortos instituted a replevin suit against Ello and Gonzales in the Court of First Instance of Quezon for the delivery of the jeep. Ello filed an answer alleging he was the owner of the stolen jeep and set up a counterclaim for damages. Gonzales was declared in default for failure to file an answer. The trial court rendered a decision ordering Mortos to return and deliver the jeep to Ello, reserving Mortos’ right to proceed against the persons who sold him the jeep. Meanwhile, while the replevin suit was pending, Ello caused a criminal prosecution for theft to be commenced against Felipe, Pañganiban, Gregorio, and Mortos. The information was dismissed as to Mortos, who was found to have bought the jeep in good faith, and as to Gregorio, who became a government witness. Felipe and Pañganiban were found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment and ordered to indemnify Ello in the sum of P1,200. Mortos appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s judgment with the modification that if Mortos failed to deliver the jeep, its value (P1,200) should be paid to Ello. Mortos appealed by certiorari.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of First Instance of Quezon had jurisdiction to proceed with the replevin suit and order the delivery of the jeep to Victor Ello, considering that a criminal case for theft had been filed where the thieves were ordered to indemnify Ello, and the information against Mortos was dismissed.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision. The Court held that the replevin suit was properly instituted by Mortos, and Ello merely assumed a defensive position; thus, it was unnecessary for Ello to make a reservation of his civil action in the criminal case because he was legally in possession of the jeep. Although Ello set up a counterclaim, his answer alleged ownership, and both the trial court and the Court of Appeals properly awarded possession of the jeep to Ello pursuant to Section 9, Rule 62 of the Rules of Court, which provides that possession of disputed property should be adjudicated to the one entitled thereto. Moreover, Ello had not received or tried to enforce the indemnity awarded in the criminal case, and under Article 105 of the Revised Penal Code, the owner of stolen property is entitled to its restitution. Ello’s right to possession is predicated on Article 464 of the Civil Code, which allows the recovery of lost movable property from any possessor, with the possessor in good faith entitled to reimbursement of the price paid. The alternative judgment for the delivery of the jeep or its value is authorized by Section 9 of Rule 62.