G.R. No. L-5033 June 28, 1954
In the matter of the Summary Settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased JOSE M. FRANCISCO, TIBURCIA M. VDA. DE FRANCISCO, administratrix-appellees, vs. FAUSTA CARREON and CATALINA CARREON, oppositors-appellants.

FACTS

On September 2, 1947, Rosa Aldana Francisco petitioned for the summary settlement of the estate of her deceased husband, Jose M. Francisco, who died in 1944. She alleged under oath that they had three minor legitimate children as his legal heirs, that the deceased left a parcel of land with a house, and that there were no creditors. She asked to be declared the usufructuary and for the property to be adjudicated to herself and the three children. The court granted her petition and, in an order dated November 29, 1947, declared Rosa and her three children as the only heirs, awarding Rosa a one-half undivided share and the other half to the children in equal parts. This order was registered, and a new certificate of title was issued.
On August 4, 1948, Rosa mortgaged her share to the Carreon sisters (Fausta and Catalina) for P13,000, and later, on January 19, 1950, she sold her interest to them absolutely. Both transactions were duly registered.
On March 14, 1950, Tiburcia M. Vda. de Francisco, the mother of the deceased, allegedly representing a minor named Jose Francisco y Palumpon (claimed to be a recognized natural son of the deceased), filed a motion. She alleged that Rosa had concealed the existence of this natural son, that the proceedings were void due to conflicting interests (as Rosa was representing her children while claiming a share herself), and that the land was the deceased’s private property acquired before marriage, so Rosa was entitled only to usufruct, not ownership. Tiburcia prayed for various remedies, including her appointment as guardian ad litem for the natural and legitimate children, declaration of the natural child’s rights, annulment of the November 29, 1947 order, annulment of the mortgage and sale to the Carreon sisters, and instructions to the Register of Deeds.
The court appointed Macaria Palumpon (the natural child’s mother) as his guardian ad litem and Tiburcia as guardian ad litem for the three legitimate minors. During the hearing, Macaria requested the dismissal without prejudice of the natural child’s demand for recognition, which was granted. The court then proceeded to hear the petition regarding the reopening of the order for the benefit of the three legitimate minors. The Carreon sisters objected, arguing that with the natural child’s withdrawal, the court had no authority to continue. Tiburcia then filed an “amended motion” on behalf of the three legitimate children, praying for the same remedies except those related to the natural child. The court admitted the amended motion, heard it, and rendered judgment holding that the property was the deceased’s private property acquired before marriage. It revoked the November 29, 1947 order, declared that the whole property passed to the three legitimate children subject to Rosa’s usufructuary rights, annulled the mortgage and sale to the Carreon sisters, and issued instructions to the Register of Deeds. Rosa acquiesced, but the Carreon sisters appealed.

ISSUE

1. Whether the lower court erred in continuing to hear the motion for reopening after the natural child had withdrawn from the litigation.
2. Whether the lower court, acting as a probate court, had jurisdiction to annul the mortgage and sale executed by Rosa Aldana Francisco in favor of the Carreon sisters.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s order.
On the first issue, the Court held that the original motion of March 14, 1950, though initially filed on behalf of the natural child, also prayed for relief beneficial to the three legitimate children. Therefore, it could be liberally regarded as interposed on behalf of all four children. Furthermore, the “amended motion” could be treated as a new and independent petition filed on behalf of the three legitimate minors. Such a petition was timely under Section 5 of Rule 74, which allows a minor to petition for reopening within one year after reaching majority, and the minors were still minors at the time. The appellants’ contention that the petition should have been filed within two years under Section 4 of Rule 74 was incorrect, as Section 5 specifically governs minors’ rights. The annotation of Section 4, Rule 74 on the certificate of title was sufficient warning to the appellants that the title was subject to the interests of persons unduly prejudiced, including minors under Section 5.
On the second issue, the Court held that the probate court had jurisdiction to annul the mortgage and sale. The property was admittedly part of the decedent’s estate, and the court’s task in a summary settlement is to determine the lawful heirs and apportion the estate among them. Section 4 of Rule 74 (applicable by extension to situations under Section 5) expressly authorizes the court to give every heir his lawful participation in real estate “notwithstanding any transfers” and to “issue execution” thereon. This implies the authority to direct the cancellation of alienations when necessary to effect a proper reapportionment among heirs. Requiring a separate action for annulment would contravene the rule and the spirit of summary settlements. The case of Mendiola vs. Mendiola was distinguished as it involved a partition by contract among parties all of age.