GR L 49999; (August, 1990) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-49999 August 6, 1990
Carmelo & Bauermann, Inc., petitioner, vs. National Labor Relations Commission, Labor Arbiter Julio F. Andres, Jr., Carmelo & Bauermann United Workers Union, and Nelpio Cabrera, et al., respondents. Benjamin Tolentino, et al., intervenors.
FACTS
Petitioner Carmelo & Bauermann, Inc. filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition to annul a decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which found it guilty of unfair labor practice and ordered the reinstatement with back wages of individual private respondents. While the case was pending before the Supreme Court, the petitioner and the private respondents, through their counsel, jointly filed a “Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice” dated April 10, 1980. They based this motion on a Quitclaim and Release Agreement, signifying that the case and all incidents had been amicably settled to the full satisfaction of the parties.
Subsequently, twenty-one persons, led by Benjamin Tolentino, filed a motion for leave to intervene. These intervenors were not parties in the original NLRC case but claimed to be among thirty-three office personnel and employees similarly situated who were mentioned in the NLRC decision. They sought a declaration that their dismissal and conversion to casual status were void, that separation pay they received should be treated as a penalty for unfair labor practice, and that they be restored as permanent regular employees with full benefits. They urged the Court to hold the joint motion to dismiss in abeyance, arguing that dismissal would forever bar their legal rights.
ISSUE
Whether the intervenors should be allowed to intervene in the certiorari proceedings and whether the joint motion to dismiss by the original parties should be granted.
RULING
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition in intervention and granted the joint motion to dismiss. The legal logic is clear. The special civil action of certiorari is a proceeding in personam, binding only upon the parties thereto and their successors in interest. The intervenors were never parties to the original NLRC case or to the certiorari petition. Consequently, the NLRC decision and any adjudication by the Supreme Court in this review would not affect, foreclose, or resolve any claims the intervenors might have regarding their employment with the petitioner or the releases they executed. They were neither indispensable nor proper parties, as their presence was not essential for a complete determination of the rights between the original parties.
Furthermore, the motion to intervene was filed at a very late stage, after the NLRC had decided the case on the merits and after the principal parties had reached an amicable settlement. Allowing intervention would derail this settlement and delay the termination of the controversy. The Court also emphasized that it is not a trier of facts; the intervenors’ claims would require a factual investigation for which evidence must be received, a function inappropriate for a certiorari proceeding. Their proper and adequate remedy, if any, lies in a separate proceeding before the NLRC, which has original jurisdiction over such matters. The Court found the Quitclaim and Release Agreement underlying the joint motion to be not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Therefore, the main petition was also dismissed.
