G.R. No. L-49872 June 20, 1988
FELIPE DE VENECIA and FAUSTO MANIPON, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and MIGUEL DOMANTAY, respondents.

FACTS

The case originated from an agrarian complaint filed by Miguel Domantay against Felipe de Venecia and Fausto Manipon. The Court of Agrarian Relations initially dismissed the case, finding no tenancy relationship. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed this finding in its December 3, 1976 decision. It declared the existence of a tenancy relationship but also found Domantay had committed acts justifying his dispossession, specifically maintaining gambling operations and surreptitiously harvesting and selling bamboo from the landholding. The dispositive portion ordered de Venecia to pay Domantay certain amounts, and ordered Domantay’s ejectment, but left to the lower court the determination of whether such ejectment should be implemented in view of Presidential Decree No. 316, relating to Presidential Decree No. 27.
Upon remand, the petitioners moved for execution of the ejectment order. The CAR, instead of issuing the writ, referred the matter to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform for a certification on whether ejectment was proper under the cited decrees. The MAR later issued a certification stating the case was not yet proper for execution. Subsequently, the CAR granted the petitioners’ second motion for execution. Domantay appealed this order to the Court of Appeals, which set aside the CAR’s execution order, effectively preventing the ejectment. The petitioners then elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether the Court of Agrarian Relations was legally compelled to withhold execution of the final and executory ejectment order against Domantay pending a certification from the Ministry of Agrarian Reform under Presidential Decree No. 316 or Presidential Decree No. 1038.

RULING

The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the CAR’s order for issuance of a writ of execution. The Court held that neither Presidential Decree No. 316 nor Presidential Decree No. 1038 applied to bar the immediate execution of the final judgment. PD 316, which prohibits the ejectment of tenant-farmers from rice and corn lands without a prior MAR certification, was inapplicable because the land in question was a mango plantation, not devoted to rice or corn. PD 1038, which extended a similar certification requirement to lands devoted to other crops, also did not apply. The Court found that PD 1038, by its own terms, applied only to ejectment cases filed after its effectivity. The ejectment in this case was ordered by a final judgment rendered long before the decree took effect. Therefore, there was no legal impediment to the execution of the Court of Appeals’ 1976 decision. The CAR’s referral to the MAR and the resulting certification were deemed unnecessary and without legal effect. A final judgment must be executed as a matter of right, and the applicable agrarian laws did not provide a statutory basis to suspend its execution under the circumstances of this case.