G.R. No. L-4987; June 30, 1952
VICENTE FLORDELIZA, petitioner, vs. BERNABELA FLORDELIZA, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS

On February 19, 1946, Civil Case No. 46 was tried in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, presided by Judge Pedro Valdez Liongson. Judge Liongson was transferred to Albay without deciding the case. On August 7, 1946, the plaintiffs moved the court, then presided by Judge Jose R. de Venecia, to have the case decided as it had been submitted. The returned records contained Judge Liongson’s signed decision dated June 27, 1946, with a certification that it was signed and promulgated that day by virtue of Supreme Court authorization through the Department of Justice. The plaintiffs moved for execution on August 16, 1946. The defendant, Vicente Flordeliza, objected, arguing Judge Liongson lacked jurisdiction. The court ordered execution upon the filing of a bond. On September 12, 1946, the defendant filed a motion to vacate the decision and the order of execution, which was denied on November 7, 1946. The defendant took no further action until August 14, 1951, when he filed the present petition for certiorari to set aside the decision and order of execution and to seek a new trial.

ISSUE

Whether the petition for certiorari should be granted to set aside the decision rendered by Judge Valdez Liongson and the subsequent order of execution, on the grounds that the judge lacked jurisdiction due to his transfer and the rejection of his appointment, and due to alleged procedural irregularities.

RULING

The petition is dismissed. The Court held that Judge Valdez Liongson was authorized to render the decision by virtue of Administrative Order No. 127 dated June 6, 1946, from the Department of Justice, which allowed him to hold court in Camarines Sur from June 25 to June 30, 1946, to decide cases previously heard and submitted to him. The decision carried a certification of its promulgation on June 27, 1946, and there is a legal presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty. The petitioner’s challenge to the accuracy of the certification and the judge’s authority was already denied by the lower court in its order of November 7, 1946. The petitioner’s delay of nearly five years in filing the petition for certiorari, after the denial of his motion to vacate, constitutes gross negligence or indifference. Furthermore, the controversies regarding whether Judge Liongson had been informed of the rejection of his appointment by the Commission on Appointments and the exact date of the decision’s promulgation are factual issues not proper for a petition for certiorari; an independent action for annulment would be the appropriate remedy.