G.R. No. L-4961 March 5, 1952
ASUNCION PARKER, in her own behalf and as legal guardian of her child KATHLEEN PARKER, petitioner, vs. HON. ALEJANDRO J. PANLILIO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and PHILIPPINE AIR LINES INC., respondents.

FACTS

On January 16, 1950, Asuncion Parker, for herself and as guardian of her child Kathleen, filed a civil case (No. 10105) in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Philippine Air Lines, Inc. (PAL) to recover damages for PAL’s alleged failure to safely carry Richard Parker on its plane from Daet, Camarines Norte to Manila, which exploded in mid-air. PAL’s amended answer raised the special defense that the explosion was due to dynamite surreptitiously introduced into the aircraft, for which a criminal case (No. 268) was filed in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte against the supposed perpetrators. During the trial of the civil case, after the plaintiffs had presented their evidence and the defendant had begun presenting its evidence, PAL orally moved to suspend the hearing, invoking subsection (c), Section 1, Rule 107 of the Rules of Court, which provides that a civil action arising from the same offense cannot be prosecuted until final judgment in the criminal proceeding. The respondent judge granted the motion and suspended the civil case pending final determination of the criminal case, which was on appeal. Petitioner filed this certiorari petition to set aside that order and compel the judge to proceed with the civil trial.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in suspending the hearing of the civil case for damages based on alleged culpa contractual against PAL until the final determination of the criminal case against the alleged perpetrators of the explosion.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the petition. The Court recognized that the present civil case against PAL is based on a cause of action (culpa contractual or culpa aquiliana under Articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code) distinct from the civil liability arising from the offense charged in the criminal case against the accused strangers. The failure of the petitioner to reserve her right to institute a separate civil action in the criminal case did not constitute a waiver of her right to sue PAL on its separate contractual or extra-contractual liability, as these are independent actions based on distinct causes of action. However, the Court found that the civil case was directly interwoven with the criminal case because the main issue in both is the determination of the cause of Richard Parker’s death (the plane explosion). The power to grant continuances is inherent in courts, and there was no showing that the lower court abused its discretion in suspending the hearing to await the final judgment in the criminal case. Hence, the petition was denied.
Separate Opinions:
Justice Pablo dissented, arguing that the general rule to suspend civil actions when a criminal action is instituted should not apply because the result of the criminal case (the guilt or innocence of the accused) does not alter the civil liability of PAL. PAL’s liability is determined by the conduct of its management, not the criminal liability of the accused. Therefore, suspending the civil case was unnecessary.