G.R. No. L-49252, November 13, 1946
FERNANDO GUEVARRA and MARCOS GUEVARRA, petitioners, vs. VICENTE DEL ROSARIO, Judge of First Instance of Tayabas, HERMOGENES CALUAG, PASTOR C. JAVIER, CARLOS A. BUENDIA, and SEBASTIAN A. LIWAG, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners Fernando Guevarra and Marcos Guevarra filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent Judge of First Instance of Tayabas to conduct a preliminary investigation on a complaint they filed on June 28, 1944. The complaint charged respondents Hermogenes Caluag (Provincial Fiscal), Pastor C. Javier (Municipal Mayor), Carlos A. Buendia (Justice of the Peace), and Sebastian A. Liwag (Clerk of Court) with the crime of falsification of public documents under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. The petitioners also sought to compel the court to communicate with the Secretary of Justice for the appointment of an acting fiscal due to the incumbent’s disqualification. Two days after the complaint was filed, the respondent court ordered its return to the petitioners, stating that the Ministry of Justice or the Bureau of Public Prosecution should first be heard. A motion for reconsideration was denied on July 14, 1944. During the pendency of this mandamus proceeding, the Director of Prisons reported that the petitioners had died in Bilibid Prisons. Emilio Guevarra and Ciriaco Guevarra (son and brother of the petitioners) then filed a motion to be allowed to substitute the deceased petitioners in the case.

ISSUE

Whether the action for mandamus survives the death of the petitioners, thereby allowing their heirs or legal representatives to substitute for them and continue the proceeding.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court denied the motion for substitution and declared the petition for a writ of mandamus abated.
The Court held that the determination of whether substitution is proper depends on whether the cause of action survives the death of a party. The cause of action in this mandamus proceeding arose from the respondent court’s failure to conduct a preliminary investigation upon a criminal complaint filed by the petitioners. The right to file such a complaint is personal, as required under the rules (then Section 2, Rule 106), which mandated that a complaint charging an offense must be subscribed by the offended party. Since this right is personal, the complaint itself abated upon the death of the petitioners. Consequently, the cause of action in the mandamus proceeding, which was derivative of that personal complaint, was also personal and did not survive to the petitioners’ heirs or legal representatives. The heirs could not complain of the court’s failure to act on a complaint they themselves did not file. Therefore, the proceeding could not be continued by the heirs, and the petition was abated.
Separate Opinions:
* Justice Feria (concurring): Agreed with the result but elaborated on the applicable principles. He clarified that under the Rules of Court, a mandamus proceeding is a special civil action to which the rules on substitution of parties (Rule 3, Section 17) apply. The abatement of a mandamus action upon the death of the petitioner is not a universal rule but depends on the nature of the right sought to be enforced. If the right is entirely personal and does not survive, the action abates. In this case, the right to file and prosecute the criminal complaint was personal to the deceased petitioners.
* Justice Perfecto (dissenting): Argued that the motion for substitution should be granted and the petition for mandamus should be upheld. He emphasized that the lower court violated procedural rules by not conducting the preliminary investigation and that the alleged crime involved public officials, making the matter one of public interest. He contended that the petitioners’ death did not extinguish the state’s interest in prosecuting the crime or the heirs’ interest in clearing the petitioners’ names, as they were the accused in the related murder case (in which they were later acquitted).