G.R. No. L-492; June 28, 1946
TEODORO CANTOS (TEODORO TATISHI), petitioner, vs. WILHELM D. STYER, Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Western Pacific, respondent.

FACTS

Petitioner Teodoro Cantos (also known as Teodoro Tatishi), a resident of Ilang, Davao City, filed a petition for habeas corpus against Lieutenant General Wilhelm D. Styer. He alleged he was a Filipino citizen and was confined by order of the respondent at the residence of the High Commissioner in Manila without legal cause. The petitioner is the son of a Japanese father and a Filipino mother. At age 27, he elected Filipino citizenship under the name Teodoro Cantos and was granted Philippine citizenship by the Court of First Instance of Davao on September 17, 1939. On March 25, 1946, he was indicted for war crimes before a military commission duly constituted by order of General Styer. The charges specified that Teodoro Tatishi, “a Japanese civilian,” willfully and unlawfully killed unarmed, non-combatant Filipino civilians at Tibungko, Davao City, on or about December 28, 1941, and looted personal property at Ilang, Davao City, on or about January 7, 1942, in violation of the laws of war. The military commission, after hearing, found the petitioner guilty and sentenced him to death by hanging.

ISSUE

Whether the military commission constituted by the United States Army Forces has jurisdiction to try and convict the petitioner, a naturalized Filipino citizen, for alleged war crimes.

RULING

The Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Moran, dismissed the petition for habeas corpus. The Court ruled that the military commission had jurisdiction over the petitioner. The Court held that war crimes may be committed by any person, regardless of nationality, including those who are not lawful belligerents but commit hostile acts. Citing principles from the Rules of Land Warfare and the Hague Convention, as well as the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Ex parte Quirin, the Court stated that citizenship does not relieve an individual from the consequences of unlawful belligerency in violation of the law of war. The petitioner, though a Filipino citizen, associated himself with Japan during the war against the United States and the Philippines and committed atrocities against unarmed Filipino civilians, thereby making him a war criminal subject to the military commission’s jurisdiction. The Court also addressed the argument that the military commission’s authority, derived from instructions to General MacArthur, was limited to “Japanese war criminals.” It found no conclusive evidence that General MacArthur’s authority was so limited. Furthermore, the Court noted that the military commission, after hearing evidence, found the petitioner to be a Japanese mestizo and could look beyond his naturalization papers. There was evidence before the commission that the petitioner was a member of the Japanese civilian army during the war and had sworn in his naturalization oath to own property worth P1,200, while his sworn testimony before the commission indicated he never owned any property in the Philippines. The military commission could therefore believe that the petitioner never acquired or had already lost his Filipino citizenship, and the Supreme Court found no reason to interfere with that determination.
SEPARATE OPINION:
Justice Perfecto, dissenting (with Justice Briones concurring), argued that the military commission lacked jurisdiction. The dissent emphasized that, according to the U.S. Supreme Court in In re Yamashita, the commission was established under specific presidential instructions to General MacArthur to try “Japanese war criminals.” Since the petitioner was a naturalized Filipino citizen and not a Japanese national, the commission acted outside its statutory jurisdiction. Citing principles of statutory jurisdiction, the dissent argued that the commission’s proceedings were null and void. It concluded that if the petitioner was to be prosecuted, it should be before a proper special tribunal or the ordinary civil courts of the Philippines, and he should be discharged from confinement.