G.R. No. L-49003. April 30, 1979.
D. O. PLAZA ENTERPRISES, INC. (now AGUSAN WOOD INDUSTRIES, INC.), petitioner, vs. THE HON. CARMELO C. NORIEL, as Director of the BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, DANILO P. CRUZ, as Officer-In-Charge of the BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, MINDANAO ASSOCIATION OF TRADE UNIONS (MATU), PHILIPPINE LABOR ALLIANCE COUNCIL (PLAC), respondents.

FACTS

D. O. Plaza Enterprises, Inc. (now Agusan Wood Industries, Inc.) filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to prevent the holding of a certification election among its workers. The petition was initially dismissed by the Supreme Court in a resolution dated December 11, 1978. The Court found the petition to be fundamentally infirm as it was filed by the employer, who sought to interfere in the process of determining the exclusive bargaining representative of its employees. The Court, citing settled jurisprudence, emphasized that management must maintain a strict “hands-off” policy in certification elections to avoid any suspicion of partiality and to ensure the workers’ free and untrammeled choice.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the Court failed to consider a material allegation. It cited a letter from PC Regional Commander Col. Alfredo S. Olano recommending the temporary suspension of any projected certification election in certain logging firms, including the petitioner, due to escalating subversive insurgent activities in Agusan del Sur. Petitioner asserted it had no objection to a certification election in principle but argued for its temporary suspension until the peace and order situation improved to ensure a free and peaceful election.

ISSUE

Whether the alleged peace and order situation in Agusan del Sur, as cited in a military recommendation, constitutes a valid legal ground to suspend or prohibit the holding of a certification election.

RULING

The Supreme Court denied the motion for reconsideration and affirmed the dismissal of the petition. The Court held that the alleged peace and order concern did not justify judicial interference to stop the certification election. The legal logic is clear and twofold. First, the primary and fundamental infirmity of the petition remained: it was filed by the employer. The right to self-organization and to choose a bargaining representative belongs solely to the workers. Management’s intervention in this process is repugnant to the concept of collective bargaining and the constitutional and statutory policy of protecting labor and promoting social justice. The employer’s interest in the matter is, at best, highly suspect.
Second, the Court found the new allegation regarding the peace and order situation unpersuasive. The determination of whether prevailing conditions allow for the free conduct of a certification election is best addressed to the discretion of the Ministry (now Department) of Labor, not the courts. The Solicitor General correctly argued that negating the workers’ freedom to choose their bargaining agent could potentially cause more unrest. Furthermore, the duty to maintain peace and order during the election rests with the military and police authorities, who are obligated to see to it that the law is complied with. The Court concluded that the rule of law must prevail, and the certification election should proceed as a means to ascertain the will of the workers, which is a fundamental tenet of labor relations.