GR L 48756; (September, 1982) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-48756 September 11, 1982
K.O. GLASS CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE MANUEL VALENZUELA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and ANTONIO D. PINZON, respondents.
FACTS
Antonio D. Pinzon filed a verified complaint for sum of money against Kenneth O. Glass, alleging unpaid truck rentals and unreturned spare parts. Pinzon sought a preliminary attachment of Glass’s assets, primarily citing that Glass was a foreigner who might depart the Philippines to defraud creditors. The respondent judge granted the writ. Kenneth O. Glass moved to quash, arguing the transactions were with the corporate entity K.O. Glass Construction Co., Inc., and that the garnished funds belonged to the corporation, not him personally. Pinzon then amended his complaint to include the corporation as a co-defendant.
Subsequently, the defendants filed a supplementary motion to dissolve the attachment, contending the supporting affidavit was legally insufficient for failing to state that the claim amount was above all legal set-offs and that there was no other sufficient security for the claim, as required by Rule 57, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. The respondent judge denied this motion and ordered the garnished funds deposited with the clerk of court. After the defendants filed a counterbond for the full attached amount, the judge still refused to order the release of the deposited money, prompting this certiorari petition.
ISSUE
Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary attachment and in refusing to release the attached funds after the filing of a counterbond.
RULING
Yes, the Supreme Court granted the petition, annulling the writ of attachment and ordering the release of the garnished funds. The legal logic is twofold. First, the issuance of the writ was improper as there was no valid ground under Rule 57, Section 1. The cited ground—that the defendant is a foreigner—is not by itself a statutory ground for attachment. The rule specifically requires an intent to depart from the Philippines with intent to defraud his creditors. The affidavit and complaint contained mere general allegations without factual assertions demonstrating such fraudulent intent, rendering the attachment baseless.
Second, upon the filing of a counterbond equivalent to the value of the attached property under Rule 57, Section 12, the judge had a ministerial duty to discharge the attachment. The purpose of attachment is to secure a potential judgment. A sufficient counterbond substitutes for the attached property and provides equivalent security for the plaintiff. The respondent judge’s refusal to order the release of the deposited cash after the approval of the counterbond constituted a grave abuse of discretion, as it deprived the defendant of the statutory right to dissolve the attachment by posting security. The orders relating to the attachment were annulled and set aside.
