G.R. No. L-4833 March 21, 1952
FRANCISCO R. VILLAROMAN, petitioner, vs. HON. GAVINO S. ABAYA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and THE MANILA SOUTHERN COLLEGES, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Francisco R. Villaroman obtained a judgment from the Municipal Court of Manila in a forcible entry and detainer case against respondent Manila Southern Colleges. The judgment ordered the defendant to vacate the premises and to pay rentals in arrears of P6,700.00, plus subsequent rents at P1,050.00 a month until fully vacated. The respondent appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila, filing an appeal bond but not a supersedeas bond. It paid rentals for October and November 1950 but failed to pay or deposit rentals for August, September 1950, and subsequent months. Petitioner filed a motion for execution of the municipal court’s judgment due to this failure. Respondent Judge Gavino S. Abaya issued an order of execution on February 16, 1951. After the sheriff levied on properties, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, claiming it had vacated and that execution could not cover collection of rentals. Petitioner opposed, citing Romero vs. Pecson. The judge issued an order on March 15, 1951, stating execution referred only to delivery of possession, not collection of arrears. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied, with the judge reiterating his view that judgments in forcible entry cases concern possession only and that executing the entire judgment would render the appeal moot.

ISSUE

Whether the writ of execution pending appeal in a forcible entry and detainer case, for failure to pay or deposit current rentals, should cover both the restitution of possession and the collection or deposit of rentals in arrears, or be limited to possession only.

RULING

The Supreme Court granted the petition for mandamus. The writ of execution pending appeal for failure to pay or deposit current rentals under Section 8, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court refers to the entire judgment of the inferior court, including both possession and payment of rentals. The Court clarified that Section 7, Rule 72, cited by the respondent judge, distinguishes between possession and ownership, not between possession and rentals. The ruling in Domingo vs. Flordeliza, which limited execution to possession, was based on old procedural law (Act No. 190), whereas Section 8 of Rule 72 contains no such limitation. The Court further explained that the appeal would not become moot because if the judgment is reversed, possession can be restored and rentals refunded under the Rules. The respondent judge was ordered to issue a writ of execution for the entire judgment of the Municipal Court.