G.R. No. L-48297 and L-48265. January 7, 1987.
DIOGENES TUASON and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL ESTEVEZ DE TUANQUI, respondents.

FACTS

The estate of Juan Estevez, represented by administratrix Isabel Estevez de Tuanqui, filed an action to quiet title over a parcel of land adjacent to its registered property, Lot 1068-A, in Legazpi, Albay. The estate claimed ownership over this adjacent land, described as a 1,059-square-meter parcel, by right of accretion, alleging it was formed through alluvial deposits from the adjoining Kapantawan River. The estate asserted it had taken immediate possession and made improvements, including a house destroyed by a typhoon. Petitioner Diogenes Tuason claimed rights over a portion of this land, applied to the Director of Lands to purchase or lease it, and secured a building permit. The estate argued this created a cloud on its title.
The trial court ruled in favor of the estate, declaring it the owner of the land (designated as Lot 109) and ordering Tuason to reconvey the title and pay damages. Both Tuason and the Director of Lands appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. Tuason also filed a petition for relief from judgment, claiming his counsel did not receive the notice of the trial court’s decision due to a change of address. This petition was denied, with the appellate court finding that multiple notices were sent and the failure to claim the mail was due to counsel’s own negligence in not updating his address of record with the court.

ISSUE

The primary issue is whether the land formed by accretion belongs to the private riparian owner or forms part of the public domain. A secondary procedural issue is whether the trial court’s denial of Tuason’s petition for relief from judgment was correct.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. On the substantive issue, the Court applied Article 457 of the Civil Code, which states that accretions formed by the gradual deposit of sediments (alluvium) belong to the owner of the riparian land. Since the estate was the registered owner of Lot 1068-A, which was bounded by the Kapantawan River, the alluvial deposit that formed the adjacent land belonged to it by operation of law. The land is not part of the public domain disposable by the Director of Lands. The estate’s prior possession and improvement of the land further strengthened its claim.
On the procedural issue, the Court upheld the denial of the petition for relief. Tuason’s counsel failed to notify the court of his change of address, violating the Rules of Court. The certification from the postal office showed three notices were sent, and the failure to claim them was due to this negligence. The Court distinguished the cited precedent of Vecino v. Court of Appeals, as it did not involve counsel’s violation of the duty to inform the court of an address change. Furthermore, Tuason failed to show what meritorious evidence he would present that could alter the outcome, making his petition pro forma. The appeal by the Director of Lands was timely, but the substantive law on accretion was decisive against the state’s claim.