G.R. No. L-48241, June 11, 1987
Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Hon. Jose P. Arro, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Br. III, Court of First Instance of Davao, Isabelo I. Pacquing, respondents.

FACTS

The Republic filed a complaint for collection of deficiency taxes against spouses Isabelo and Carmen Pacquing. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Davao rendered a decision on October 10, 1977, ordering the defendants to pay substantial sums for sales and income tax deficiencies. A copy of this decision was received at the office of the defendants’ counsel, Atty. Vicente Garcia, by his clerk on December 19, 1977. No appeal was filed within the 30-day reglementary period.
On January 19, 1978, the Republic moved for execution of the now-final judgment. However, on January 23, 1978, the private respondents, through a new counsel, Atty. Alberto Lumakang, filed a notice of appeal and a motion for extension to submit the record on appeal. The petitioner opposed this, arguing the appeal period had lapsed. The respondent judge, in his Orders dated March 9 and April 21, 1978, granted the motion for extension and gave due course to the appeal, denying the motion for execution.

ISSUE

Whether the negligence of the original counsel, Atty. Garcia, in failing to appeal within the reglementary period, binds his client, thereby rendering the trial court’s decision final and executory.

RULING

Yes, the negligence of counsel binds the client. The Supreme Court granted the petition, set aside the assailed Orders, and declared the October 10, 1977 decision final and executory. The ruling is grounded on procedural finality and the principle of representation.
The Rules of Court mandate that an appeal is perfected by filing a notice of appeal, appeal bond, and record on appeal within 30 days from notice of judgment. This period is jurisdictional; non-compliance renders the judgment final. When a party appears by attorney, service of notices must be made upon said attorney, and such service binds the client. The general rule is that a client is bound by the mistakes, negligence, or omission of his counsel.
In this case, Atty. Garcia’s clerk received the decision at the counsel’s office. Counsel’s subsequent inaction, whether due to his absence abroad or a failure to institute a proper system for handling court communications during such absence, constitutes inexcusable negligence. The Court found no exceptional circumstance to warrant a deviation from the general rule, as the counsel did not totally abandon the case but had an office and a clerk in charge. The private respondents’ remedy, if any, lies against their negligent former counsel, not against the finality of the judgment. Consequently, the trial court lost jurisdiction to entertain the belated appeal, and its orders giving due course to it were issued with grave abuse of discretion.