GR L 47915; (January, 1987) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-47915. January 7, 1987.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. REUBEN PIMENTEL Y DEQUIS, FRANCISCO CABALBAG Y CAPA alias PARAN, PABLO LAZO Y APALES, ARSENIO AQUINO Y CANLAS and TONY DOE, accused, PABLO LAZO Y APALES, appellant.
FACTS
On the night of March 19, 1971, a police strike force led by Corporal Benito Benabese conducted operations at the Vista Nightclub in Baguio. Corporal Benabese confronted and physically assaulted accused Francisco Cabalbag outside the club. Cabalbag then summoned accused Reuben Pimentel, who arrived armed. When Corporal Benabese reappeared and pointed his firearm at Pimentel, a struggle ensued. Appellant Pablo Lazo grappled with Benabese for control of the firearm, joined by another officer, Pat. Ano. During the scuffle, Pimentel followed with his gun drawn. Multiple gunshots were heard, after which Benabese was found dead. Pimentel, Cabalbag, and another accused fled, while Lazo remained at a nearby nightclub and drank a bottle of beer.
The accused were charged with Murder qualified by treachery and assault upon an agent of a person in authority. The trial court convicted Pimentel, Cabalbag, and Lazo, finding conspiracy among them. Lazo appealed, arguing the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy and his individual guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE
Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that appellant Pablo Lazo conspired with his co-accused in killing Corporal Benabese.
RULING
The Supreme Court ACQUITTED appellant Pablo Lazo. The ruling hinged on the insufficiency of evidence to prove conspiracy. Conspiracy must be established by clear and convincing evidence, not merely presumed. The Court found the trial court’s conclusion of conspiracy was based on inferences not supported by the evidence.
The legal logic is that for circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction, it must satisfy three requisites: (1) more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Here, the circumstances against Lazo did not meet this standard. His act of grappling for the gun was an isolated reaction to Benabese pointing the weapon, not a concerted action with Pimentel to kill. His failure to flee after the incident was an equivocal act that could not, by itself, indicate guilt, especially since he was not shown to have prior association with the principal accused. The hearsay testimony about a prior shooting incident involving Pimentel did not implicate Lazo. Without proof of a prior agreement or concerted action towards the killing, Lazo’s individual criminal liability was not established. The Court emphasized that where conspiracy is not proven, the act of one is not the act of all, and each accused’s liability must be determined individually based on their own participation.
