GR L 4781; (October, 1908) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-4781
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BALTASAR SARMIENTO, defendant-appellant.
October 21, 1908
FACTS:
Baltasar Sarmiento, a councilor of the municipality of Tagbilaran, was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Bohol for being interested in two cockpits and a billiard hall within the municipality. This was found to be contrary to Section 28 of Act No. 82, as amended by Act No. 663.
Sarmiento’s defense argued that Act No. 82, as amended, was rendered ineffective by the Internal Revenue Law, Act No. 1189. They invoked the principle cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex (when the reason for the law ceases, the law itself ceases). The defense pointed out that Act No. 1189, specifically Section 146(e), expressly repealed provisions of Act No. 82 (such as Section 43(h)) that authorized municipalities to exact licenses for cockpits, billiard tables, and similar establishments. Furthermore, Section 146(a) of Act No. 1189 generally repealed all laws authorizing taxes of this nature. The defense implied that since municipalities could no longer license or tax these establishments, municipal councilors no longer had “power” or “concern” over them, thus removing the reason for the prohibition against their interest.
ISSUE:
Did the repeal of the municipality’s power to license cockpits and billiard halls by the Internal Revenue Law (Act No. 1189) render ineffective the prohibition against municipal councilors being interested in such establishments under Act No. 82, as amended by Act No. 663?
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.
The Court held that the defense’s argument overlooked the fact that municipal councils had concerns with cockpits and billiard rooms beyond mere licensing. Under Section 40(j) of Act No. 82, municipalities are charged with the power to “prohibit and clos[e] them,” which is a police power regulation rather than a revenue-generating function.
Therefore, even though municipal councilors might no longer raise revenue from these places of amusement due to the Internal Revenue Act, they nevertheless retain the power to “police and control them.” The reason behind the law prohibiting a councilor’s interest in such establishments, which is to prevent conflicts of interest and ensure impartial regulation, has not ceased. The councilman still possesses power over these establishments, making the prohibition relevant and enforceable. The Court also clarified that it was not necessary to prove that the municipality had actually licensed cockpits, as cockpits are specifically mentioned in Act No. 663.
The sentence of six months of prision with costs, imposed by the Court of First Instance, was affirmed.
