G.R. No. L-4758; May 30, 1953
CALTEX (PHIL.) INC., petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS, CALTEX CHAPTER, respondent.

FACTS

1. In an industrial dispute (Case No. 112-V), the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) issued an order on January 2, 1948, enjoining the laborers from staging a strike without the court’s authority and requiring the company to notify and obtain authority from the court before laying off or dismissing employees during the pendency of the case.
2. On February 13 and 15, 1950, the respondent Union presented new demands to the petitioner Company. On March 1, 1950, the Union declared a strike over these demands.
3. The CIR, through Presiding Judge Arsenio C. Roldan, rendered a decision on July 31, 1950. It held that: (a) the strike was not a violation of the January 2, 1948 order because it was based on new demands; but (b) the strike was illegal because its purpose was trivial, unjust, unreasonable, and without good purpose. The decision authorized the Company to dismiss those responsible for the strike.
4. The Union filed a motion for reconsideration. On January 31, 1951, the CIR in banc, by a three-to-two vote, issued a resolution reversing Judge Roldan’s decision insofar as it declared the strike illegal and authorized the dismissal of workers.
5. The Company filed an urgent petition, arguing that Judge Roldan’s decision had become final and unappealable because the Union’s motion for reconsideration was filed without proof of service to the adverse party. The CIR in banc denied this petition on April 20, 1951.
6. The Company then filed the present petition for certiorari, seeking to set aside the CIR in banc resolution and to affirm Judge Roldan’s decision.

ISSUE

1. Whether the decision of Judge Roldan dated July 31, 1950, had become final and unappealable.
2. Whether the strike declared on March 1, 1950, violated the CIR’s order of January 2, 1948.
3. Whether the strike declared on March 1, 1950, was illegal.

RULING

1. On the finality of the decision: The Supreme Court ruled that the decision of July 31, 1950, had not become final and unappealable. Even assuming the motion for reconsideration lacked proper service or proof of service, the CIR could properly entertain it as an application to reopen the case under Section 17 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended.
2. On the violation of the January 2, 1948 order: The Supreme Court affirmed that the strike did not violate the CIR’s 1948 injunction. The strike was motivated by new demands (e.g., wage differentials, retirement benefits, medical treatment, bonuses, leave) which were not connected with or similar to the demands involved in the original pending case (No. 112-V) where the injunction was issued.
3. On the legality of the strike: The Supreme Court agreed with the CIR in banc and held that the strike was not illegal. The Court found that the Union’s demands, if granted, would improve the conditions of the laborers and could not be considered trivial or illegal. The mere fact that demands may ultimately be found unreasonable or unjust does not render a strike illegal; the consequence should be the rejection of the demands, not the punishment of the workers. To condition the legality of a strike solely on the grantability of the demands would effectively outlaw strikes as a means to secure better working conditions.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
The decision of the Court of Industrial Relations in banc (the resolution of January 31, 1951) is affirmed. Costs against the petitioner.