GR L 47516; (April, 1941) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-47516. April 14, 1941.
MARIANO A. DE CASTRO, petitioner, vs. CEBU PORTLAND CEMENT CO., respondent.
FACTS
On May 18, 1938, respondent Cebu Portland Cement Co. filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against petitioner Mariano A. de Castro to recover a sum of money for cement purchases. Summons was served on de Castro on May 23, 1938. He failed to answer, and on July 30, 1938, the court declared him in default. After receiving evidence, the court rendered judgment on August 20, 1938, ordering de Castro to pay P4,717.30 with 12% annual interest from May 18, 1938, plus costs. On September 3, 1938, de Castro filed an exception and motion for a new trial, which was denied on September 10, 1938. He appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s decision and imposed double costs. De Castro then filed this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE
1. Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner despite alleged defects in the service of summons.
2. Whether the trial court erred in not treating the petitioner’s motion for new trial and answer to the motion for execution as a petition for relief under section 113 of Act No. 190 .
RULING
1. On jurisdiction: The Court found that any alleged defect in the service of summons was waived by the petitioner. The Court of Appeals had noted that the sheriff left the summons and complaint with a person of sufficient capacity at the petitioner’s residence, and no proof was presented to rebut the presumption of regularity in the sheriff’s performance. More importantly, the petitioner admitted he knew of the proceedings since August 15, 1938, yet failed to appear and object to the court’s jurisdiction before judgment. His first appearance was to file a motion for new trial on the merits, not to challenge jurisdiction. Defects in process or even absence of process may be waived by failure to object at the first opportunity.
2. On the motion for relief: The petitioner’s motion for new trial and related pleadings were filed within the period for appeal, before the judgment became final. Section 113 of Act No. 190 applies only to final judgments. Therefore, it was not applicable. Even if it were, the grant or denial of a motion to set aside a default judgment rests on the trial court’s discretion, and no abuse of discretion was shown.
The petition for certiorari was dismissed, and the appealed judgment was affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.