G.R. No. L-47442; April 8, 1941
In the matter of the estate of George M. Icard, deceased, JOSEPH K. ICARD, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CLARO MASIGAN, as special administrator of the estate of George M. Icard; and EFFIE CARLAND ICARD, defendants-appellants.

FACTS

Joseph K. Icard filed a claim for P2,000 against the estate of his deceased father, George M. Icard, for services rendered in connection with the development and location of certain mining claims. The claim was allowed by the commissioner on claims and, on appeal, by the Court of First Instance. The Antamok Central Group of mining claims were originally owned in common by Fred M. Harden, George M. Icard, and Joseph K. Icard. These claims were later sold to the Big Wedge Mining Company. A dispute over the price led to a court case (Civil Case No. 48186), which was settled by a compromise agreement. The court approved the compromise and ordered that P39,478.16 be paid to Joseph K. Icard in full settlement of his personal interest and that of George M. Icard in the mining claims. The order directed that this amount be divided between Joseph K. Icard and the estate of George M. Icard in a proportion to be determined by the probate court. Joseph K. Icard, instead of claiming a presumptive one-half share of P39,478.16 under Article 393 of the Civil Code, filed a reduced claim of only P2,000, which he sought to establish through his oral testimony.

ISSUE

Whether the probate court erred in allowing Joseph K. Icard to testify orally regarding services rendered to his deceased father, despite the prohibition under Section 383, paragraph 7 of Act No. 190 (now Rule 123, Section 26(c) of the Rules of Court), which bars a party from testifying in an action against an executor or administrator concerning any matter of fact occurring before the death of the deceased.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment allowing the claim. The prohibition under the rule (the “dead man’s statute”) is designed to prevent the surviving party from presenting false or fictitious claims against the estate of a deceased person when the deceased can no longer contradict them. However, in this case, Joseph K. Icard had a clear, written interest in the mining claims, as evidenced by the deed of sale and the court-approved compromise agreement, which entitled him to a share of P39,478.16. His oral testimony was offered only to prove a reduced claim of P2,000, which is less than what he could legally claim based on the written documents. Since the purpose of the testimony was to establish a lesser claim, thereby avoiding prejudice to the estate, the reason for the rule ceases to apply. The Court applied the principle “Ratione cessante, cessat ipsa lex” (when the reason for the law ceases, the law itself ceases). Therefore, the probate court did not err in admitting the testimony.