G.R. No. L-47315. April 25, 1941.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. TERESO DUMON, defendant-appellant.

FACTS

The defendant-appellant, Tereso Dumon, was charged with double murder for shooting and killing spouses Manuel Magbanua and Loreto Magalona in Bacolod. The Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental convicted him of double homicide, sentencing him to indeterminate penalties for each homicide, indemnification, and confiscation of his revolver. Dumon appealed, contending he acted in self-defense, should benefit from Article 247 (killing in defense of chastity) in relation to Article 49 (mistake of fact), or should be convicted only of homicide through simple imprudence. The Solicitor-General argued the crimes were two separate murders qualified by treachery, with aggravating circumstances of dwelling and evident premeditation, and that the mitigating circumstances of obfuscation and voluntary surrender should not apply. The Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court due to a divergence of opinion on imposing reclusion perpetua for double murder.
The evidence showed that after 13 years of a troubled marriage, Dumon learned his wife, Felicisima Maramara, was in love with Delfin Villaluz. On July 31, 1937, Dumon signed a document (Exhibit O) agreeing to live apart and ordering his wife to find another man to live with happily. Later, Felicisima went to Bacolod and stayed with the Magbanua spouses. On August 24, 1938, Dumon received an anonymous letter informing him of his wife’s whereabouts at 16 Smith Street, Bacolod. Armed with a revolver, he went there and, in the early morning of August 25, entered the room through a window and shot the Magbanua spouses, mistaking them for his wife and her paramour. The prosecution claimed the victims were asleep when killed, but the trial court found, based on Dumon’s testimony, that after he entered and lifted the mosquito net, the couple rose, the woman looked for something, and the man struck him and tried to wrest his gun before he fired.

ISSUE

1. Whether the qualifying circumstance of treachery was present to elevate the crime to murder.
2. Whether the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nighttime should be appreciated.
3. Whether the mitigating circumstances of obfuscation and voluntary surrender were correctly applied.
4. Whether Dumon is entitled to the benefit of Article 247 (killing in defense of chastity) in relation to Article 49 (mistake of fact).
5. Whether Dumon acted in self-defense or should be convicted only of homicide through simple imprudence.

RULING

1. No treachery. The Supreme Court adopted the trial court’s finding that the victims were not asleep when shot. They rose after Dumon lifted the mosquito net, and the man attacked him before he fired. The prosecution’s reliance on Dumon’s affidavit and a police sergeant’s testimony was insufficient to prove treachery conclusively. Thus, the crimes remained homicide, not murder.
2. No aggravating circumstances of dwelling or nighttime. The aggravating circumstance of dwelling did not apply because the house was not the dwelling of Dumon’s wife and her paramour, whom he believed he was killing. Nighttime was not appreciated because Dumon did not know the exact time he would arrive in Bacolod when he left Cebu.
3. Mitigating circumstances of obfuscation and voluntary surrender correctly applied. The trial court correctly found these mitigating circumstances. The Solicitor-General’s objection to obfuscation was overruled.
4. Article 247 not applicable. Even assuming the deceased were engaged in sexual intercourse, Article 247 could not apply because Dumon had expressly licensed his wife to commit adultery by signing Exhibit O, wherein he ordered her to live with another man. This consent barred him from invoking defense of chastity under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code.
5. No self-defense or simple imprudence. Self-defense was not established because Dumon’s intrusion constituted provocation, the weapon used was not reasonably necessary, and the victims’ actions did not constitute unlawful aggression. Homicide through simple imprudence did not apply because Dumon’s act of firing was intentional, and even if he had killed his wife and paramour, it would still be a felony.
The Supreme Court denied Dumon’s motion for new trial and affirmed the appealed judgment of the trial court convicting him of double homicide, with costs against him.