GR L 4706; (July, 1951) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-4706 July 24, 1951
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PASCASIO VILLASCO, ET AL., defendants, PASCASIO VILLASCO, defendant-appellant.
FACTS
On September 27, 1950, Pascasio Villasco and three others were charged with illegal possession of firearms and a hand grenade under Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4. The information alleged that on or about July 19, 1950, in Canlaon, Negros Oriental, they unlawfully possessed, without the necessary permit or license, one U.S. Garand rifle, two Eddystone rifles, one Carbine rifle, and one hand grenade. The case against the other three defendants was dismissed. Villasco moved to quash the information for failure to state facts constituting an offense, but the motion was denied. He initially pleaded not guilty but later moved to withdraw that plea and enter a plea of guilty. The court then sentenced him to five years imprisonment and to pay a portion of the costs. Villasco moved for reconsideration, which was denied, prompting his appeal.
ISSUE
Whether the information filed against Pascasio Villasco sufficiently alleges facts constituting the crime of illegal possession of firearms and explosives under the applicable laws.
RULING
No. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of conviction and acquitted the appellant. The information was defective as it merely alleged possession of the firearms and hand grenade without alleging that the appellant was using or carrying them on his person at the time of seizure. The applicable law, Section 1 of Republic Act No. 482 (approved June 10, 1950), provided a one-year period from its effectivity for the surrender of firearms without criminal liability, except for persons found using or carrying them (unless for the purpose of surrender). Following the precedent set in People vs. Santos Lopez y Jacinto and People vs. Aquino y Abalos, the Court ruled that mere possession within the stipulated period was not illegal; the use or carrying of the firearm was an essential ingredient of the offense. Since the information failed to allege this essential element, it did not charge a public offense. A plea of guilty cannot cure such a defect or supply missing factual allegations necessary to constitute a crime.
