GR L 46674; (September, 1985) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-46674 September 16, 1985
LAUREANO ARCILLA, petitioner, vs. BASILISA ARCILLA, SERAPIA ARCILLA, MARCELA ARCILLA, DIONISIA ARCILLA, ZACARIAS ARCILLA, GAVINA MOLO VDA. DE ARCILLA, CESAR M. ARCILLA, GLORIA M. ARCILLA, ANTONIO M. ARCILLA, POMPEY M. ARCILLA, ERNESTO M. ARCILLA, ELENA M. ARCILLA, ASUNCION M. ARCILLA, RANULFO M. ARCILLA, IGLESIA A. CAÑETE, ROSABELLA A. CAÑETE, and HONORABLE FRANCIS J. MILITANTE, Presiding Judge of Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioner Laureano Arcilla was a defendant in an action for Annulment of Sale. During pre-trial, the court set the continuation for October 2, 1975. On that date, petitioner and his counsel failed to appear. Upon plaintiffs’ motion, the court declared the defendants, including petitioner, in default and allowed the plaintiffs to present evidence ex-parte. A decision was rendered on October 27, 1976, declaring the deed of sale in favor of Laureano null and void. A copy of this decision was received by petitioner’s counsel of record, Atty. Cosme D. Monteclaros, on November 8, 1976.
On March 25, 1977, petitioner, through new counsel, filed a Motion to Lift Order of Default and to Set Aside the Decision, which was denied. Subsequently, on April 16, 1977, he filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment under Rule 38. He alleged that he learned of the decision only on March 24, 1977, and that the default order was improper as no notice of the October 2 pre-trial was served upon him. He further claimed a good defense, asserting the sale by Segunda Vda. de Arcilla was voluntary and for valuable consideration.
ISSUE
Whether the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying the Petition for Relief from Judgment for being filed out of time and for failing to show a valid defense.
RULING
No, the respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the petition. On the procedural aspect, the Court ruled that the petition was filed beyond the reglementary period. Section 3, Rule 38 requires that a petition for relief be filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment and not more than six (6) months after its entry. The reckoning point for the sixty-day period is the date counsel of record received the judgment, as notice to counsel is notice to the client. Since counsel received the decision on November 8, 1976, the petition filed on April 16, 1977, was indisputably late, having been filed well beyond the sixty-day period which expired on January 7, 1977.
On the substantive requirement of a valid defense, the Court found the petition deficient. A petition for relief must not only be timely but must also allege fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, and must be accompanied by an affidavit of merit showing a meritorious defense. Petitioner’s general allegation that the sale was voluntary was insufficient. The Court emphasized that the deed was in English and the vendor was illiterate, creating a presumption of vitiated consent under Article 1332 of the Civil Code. To establish a valid defense, petitioner should have presented affidavits from the notary public or witnesses
