GR L 4665; (October, 1952) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-4665 October 17, 1952
ROBUSTIANO CARAGAO, GORGONIA JAYME, ISABEL GARCIA HERNANDEZ and her husband BARTOLOME HERNANDEZ, AUGUSTO, SOFRONIO, ENCARNACION, ROSALINA, JUAN, ANTONIO, CARMELITA and ARSENIO, these last eight surnamed MACALALAG, petitioners, vs. HON. CIRILO C. MACEREN, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao, and G.P. SEBELLINO, judicial administrator of the Intestate of Jose Caragao, respondents.
FACTS
Petitioners filed a special action of certiorari to annul an order for immediate execution issued by Judge Cirilo Maceren in Civil Case No. 288. The underlying judgment found that petitioner Robustiano Caragao had secured the transfer to himself of three parcels of land registered in the name of the intestate Jose Caragao, which he then sold to his co-petitioners. The court ordered the cancellation of the new transfer certificates of title in the petitioners’ names, the issuance of new ones in the name of Jose Caragao, deceased, and for defendants to vacate the lands and pay P6,000 representing Jose Caragao’s share in the products. After the judgment was rendered, the plaintiff moved for immediate execution. The defendants opposed. The court initially granted a stay of execution upon defendants filing a supersedeas bond of P6,000. However, upon plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, the court set aside the stay order and directed the issuance of execution, stating as reason that the property would be better preserved and protected if administered by the plaintiff. Petitioners contend that after the filing of the supersedeas bond, execution could not be justified by the stated reason.
ISSUE
Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the execution of the judgment despite the filing of a supersedeas bond, based on the reason of “better preservation and protection of the property.”
RULING
Yes, the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion. The general rule is that execution of a judgment is stayed by the perfection of an appeal, and execution pending appeal is the exception, permissible only upon good reasons stated in the order. When a stay of execution has been granted upon filing a supersedeas bond, only compelling reasons of urgency or justice can justify execution despite the bond. The “good reason” stated in the order—”better preservation and protection of the property”—is insufficient. The properties are three parcels of land, and there is no showing how they could be better preserved in the hands of the administrator. The judgment indicates the lands are in the hands of petitioners who have titles thereto, and with nothing to indicate bad faith, they are presumed possessors in good faith. Thus, no urgent or compelling reasons exist to justify execution after the supersedeas bond was given. The petition is granted, the order of March 2, 1951 is set aside, and the order of February 10, 1951 (granting stay upon bond) is revived.
