GR L 4647; (April, 1953) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-4647; April 20, 1953
FLOR VILLASOR, represented by her mother AUREA MACAPAGAL, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AGAPITO VILLASOR, defendant-appellant.
FACTS
A complaint was filed by Flor Villasor, an acknowledged natural daughter, through her mother and guardian ad litem Aurea Macapagal, against her father Agapito Villasor. The parties submitted a “Stipulation of facts and agreement” whereby the father promised to support the child by depositing P45 monthly with the clerk of court. The court rendered judgment making this agreement binding. Subsequently, the defendant, through a new attorney, filed a motion offering to fulfill his obligation by receiving and maintaining the minor in his house instead of paying the monthly allowance, alleging that the plaintiff’s mother had no means of livelihood and was fond of gambling and intoxicating drinks.
ISSUE
Whether the defendant-father, after having voluntarily agreed in a court-approved stipulation to provide a monthly allowance for his child’s support, can subsequently insist on his optional right under the Civil Code to support the child in his own home instead of paying the allowance.
RULING
The Court affirmed the order of the Court of First Instance denying the appellant’s motion. The optional right granted by Article 149 of the Spanish Civil Code (Article 299 of the present Code) may be waived. The defendant had expressly agreed that the mother should have custody and care of the minor and bound himself to pay a monthly allowance; therefore, he could not afterwards claim the right to support the child in his own home. Furthermore, irrespective of any waiver, this optional right may be restricted when there is a justified reason. Citing precedent, the Court noted that circumstances such as the father’s marriage to a woman who is not the child’s mother, the intention to make the support illusory, the father’s past treatment of the child, and the existence of a moral cause preventing the mother from visiting the child in the father’s house, would create disturbance and hinder the child’s development. Similar circumstances being present, the defendant may not insist on bringing up the minor in his home against the plaintiff’s and her mother’s justified objections. The order was affirmed with costs against the defendant-appellant.
