GR L 4645; (May, 1953) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-4645 May 29, 1953.
LORENZO GAUIRAN, petitioner, vs. RUFINO SAHAGUN, respondent.
FACTS
The petitioner, Lorenzo Gauiran, had been in possession of a two-hectare portion of the respondent Rufino Sahagun’s homestead for at least twenty years before the commencement of the case in 1947. The homestead, covering a little over twelve hectares, was patented, and Original Certificate of Title No. 426 was issued to Sahagun on May 19, 1928. The possession began around 1917 when Gauiran started clearing the area, which was part of a joint clearing, occupation, and cultivation effort with Sahagun, constituting a joint tenancy. On January 28, 1930, within the five-year period prohibited for alienation under the Public Land Act, Sahagun and his wife executed a document (Exhibit 1) confirming their desire to give the two-hectare land to Gauiran, recognizing him as the real owner and cultivator who helped pay expenses. Sahagun later filed an action for recovery of possession. The Court of First Instance of Cagayan ruled in favor of Gauiran, declaring him the lawful owner and ordering subdivision. The Court of Appeals reversed this, holding the agreement violated Section 21 of Act No. 2874 (the Public Land Act) as it was an alienation within the prohibited period and was therefore null and void, ordering Gauiran to return possession.
ISSUE
Whether the agreement between the parties, confirmed by the January 28, 1930 document, for Sahagun to convey a portion of his homestead to Gauiran, is null and void for violating the prohibition against alienation under Section 21 of Act No. 2874 .
RULING
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. It held that the rule in Oliveros vs. Porciongcola, which nullifies alienations made in violation of Section 21 of Act No. 2874 , does not apply to this case. Here, the joint tenancy between Gauiran and Sahagun, where both jointly occupied, cleared, and cultivated the homestead, came into existence before the filing and approval of the homestead application and the issuance of the patent. The agreement confirmed in the 1930 document was not a prohibited alienation or encumbrance “from the date of the approval of the application” but was rather a fulfillment of a pre-existing joint tenancy arrangement. The Court analogized the situation to a co-owner unlawfully deprived of his share in property registered in another’s name, where equity compels reconveyance. The Supreme Court dismissed Sahagun’s complaint and ordered him to reconvey the two-hectare portion in the southern part of the homestead to Gauiran after subdivision, with subdivision costs borne proportionately by the parties.
