G.R. No. L-46303 May 9, 1988
VICENTE S. UMALI, petitioner, vs. HON. JORGE COQUIA, Presiding Judge of CFI, Manila, Branch XI, RESTITUTO AGUS and DOLORES LUDOVIRCO, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Vicente Umali and private respondents Restituto Agus and Dolores Ludovico were co-defendants in a collection case filed by Aboitiz Marketing Corporation. The trial court rendered a decision on July 15, 1967, ordering all defendants, including Umali, Agus, and Ludovico, to pay the plaintiff jointly and severally. The decision also adjudged, on a cross-claim, that petitioner Umali and another co-defendant were solidarily liable to pay private respondents Agus and Ludovico the sum of P27,250.00. Petitioner did not appeal this judgment.
Subsequently, writs of execution were issued against petitioner on August 15, 1973, October 31, 1974, and July 24, 1975, but were returned unsatisfied. On October 14, 1976, private respondents filed a motion to examine petitioner as a judgment debtor under Section 38, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court. The respondent judge granted the motion. Petitioner opposed, contending the judgment had already prescribed and was no longer enforceable, leading to this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion to examine the petitioner as a judgment debtor, considering the claim that the period for enforcing the judgment had prescribed.

RULING

Yes, the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion. The Supreme Court granted the petition, setting aside the challenged resolutions. The legal logic centers on the prescriptive period for enforcing judgments by motion under Section 6, Rule 39. A judgment may be executed by motion within five years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and executory. After the lapse of this period, the judgment can only be enforced by initiating a separate civil action for revival of judgment.
The Court meticulously computed the prescriptive period. The trial court’s decision, which included the adjudication on the cross-claim in favor of private respondents, became final and executory as to petitioner Umali on August 14, 1967, the last day for him to appeal. The five-year period for execution by motion therefore commenced on August 15, 1967, and expired on August 14, 1972. Private respondents’ motion for examination of the judgment debtor was filed only on October 14, 1976, which was clearly beyond the five-year prescriptive period. The Court rejected private respondents’ argument that the period should be counted from the finality of a separate Court of Appeals decision involving a different co-defendant, as that appeal was irrelevant to the finality of the cross-claim judgment between the parties herein. Consequently, the right to execute the judgment by motion had prescribed, and the order for debtor’s examination was issued without legal basis. The temporary restraining order was made permanent.