GR L 45889; (May, 1939) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-45889; May 5, 1939
CRISPINO ENRIQUEZ, petitioner-appellant, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent-appellee.
FACTS
Crispino Enriquez owns a fishpond in Pampanga, comprised of two parcels of land separated by a portion of the Dalayap River, a navigable public stream. The fishpond’s dikes enclose and obstruct this portion of the river. The Secretary of Public Works and Communications, after investigation, found the closure prejudicial to public interest and ordered Enriquez to remove the obstruction within 30 days. Enriquez denied the allegations and requested a reinvestigation but did not comply with the removal order. Subsequently, an information was filed against him for violating Section 25-A of Act No. 3208. He was convicted by the lower courts, and the Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. Enriquez appealed to the Supreme Court via certiorari.
ISSUE
1. Whether the criminal action against Enriquez was premature due to his pending petition for reinvestigation.
2. Whether the case is civil in nature because it involves a question of ownership over real property.
3. Whether Section 25-A of Act No. 3208 constitutes an undue delegation of judicial power.
RULING
1. No, the criminal action was not premature. The 30-day period for removal fixed by the Secretary under Section 25-A of Act No. 3208 is statutory and cannot be extended except on grounds not present here. A mere petition for reinvestigation does not automatically suspend the running of this period unless expressly stated by the Secretary. Allowing such petitions to suspend enforcement would enable violators to delay compliance indefinitely, to the detriment of public interest.
2. No, the case is not civil in nature. Section 25-A of Act No. 3208 expressly penalizes the failure to comply with a legal removal order from the Secretary. Enriquez’s denial of the obstruction and his claim of ownership are merely defenses that, if proven, could negate criminal liability, but they do not alter the criminal character of the act as defined by law.
3. The constitutional challenge is not properly raised. The authority granted to the Secretary to order the removal of obstructions to public waters is executive, not judicial, in character. Moreover, under procedural rules, constitutional questions must be raised directly before the Supreme Court from the Court of First Instance. Since Enriquez appealed to the Court of Appeals, where constitutional issues cannot be entertained, and the Supreme Court is only reviewing the Court of Appeals’ decision, the constitutional objection cannot be considered.
The judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED.
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