G.R. No. L-45885 April 28, 1983
JULIAN MENDOZA, petitioner, vs. HON. CRISPIN V. BAUTISTA, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN, BRANCH III, and SPOUSES RENATO MACAPAGAL and CORAZON MACAPAGAL, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Julian Mendoza, a contractor, entered into a written agreement with respondent spouses Renato and Corazon Macapagal to construct a house for a fixed price. Disputes arose during construction, leading Mendoza to file a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. His complaint contained two causes of action: first, for the recovery of P145,814.00 as the value of alleged additional work performed at the respondents’ request, and second, for P48,000.00 as the unpaid balance of the original contract price. In his pleading, Mendoza explicitly admitted the additional work was performed without a written agreement.
After filing their answer and conducting a pre-trial, the respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. They invoked Article 1724 of the Civil Code, which requires that any change in plans and specifications, and the corresponding additional price, must be authorized and determined in writing. The trial court granted the motion, dismissing the entire complaint. It ruled that the written authorization was a condition precedent for recovery, and since it was absent for the additional work, the complaint was dismissible. The court did not address the separate cause of action for the unpaid contract balance.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court correctly dismissed the entire complaint for failure to state a cause of action based solely on the lack of written authorization for extra work under Article 1724 of the Civil Code.

RULING

No. The Supreme Court annulled and set aside the trial court’s orders. The legal logic is clear: a motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint. The court must assume the averments to be true. The complaint pleaded two distinct causes of action. The first, for additional work, faced a potential legal bar under Article 1724 due to the admitted lack of written agreement. However, the second cause of action, for the unpaid balance of the original contract price, stood independently. This claim did not rely on any extra work or changes but on the basic contractual obligation. The trial court erred by dismissing the entire suit without considering this separate and valid claim. Even if the first cause of action was legally infirm, the second, on its face, stated a valid claim for relief. Therefore, the complaint as a whole could not be dismissed for failure to state any cause of action. The Supreme Court directed the remand of the case for trial on the merits, particularly on the unresolved claim for the contract balance. The Court also found the petition timely filed and properly constituted as an appeal by certiorari under Republic Act No. 5440 .