GR L 45650; (March, 1982) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-45650 March 29, 1982
Cresencio Andres and Proceso Guimmayen, petitioners, vs. Hon. Bonifacio A. Cacdac, Jr., in his capacity as Judge-Designate of the Circuit Criminal Court, First Judicial District, Tuguegarao, Cagayan and The People of the Philippines, respondents.
FACTS
An information for Murder was filed against petitioners and another accused on January 27, 1965, in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan. After several postponements, the case was provisionally dismissed by the court on March 6, 1969. The order of dismissal explicitly stated it was made with the consent of the accused and their counsel, and directed the police to locate witnesses so the case could be refiled. Over seven years later, on May 31, 1976, a new information for the same murder was filed before the Circuit Criminal Court. Petitioners moved to quash, pleading double jeopardy and a denial of their right to a speedy trial, arguing the provisional dismissal amounted to an acquittal. The trial court denied their motion.
ISSUE
Whether the refiling of the murder case constitutes double jeopardy and violates the petitioners’ right to a speedy trial.
RULING
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, ruling that double jeopardy did not attach and the right to speedy trial was not violated. For double jeopardy to exist, the dismissal of the first case must have been without the express consent of the accused. Here, the March 6, 1969 order expressly noted the provisional dismissal was “with the consent of the accused and their counsel.” This consent constituted a waiver of their constitutional right against a second jeopardy. Consequently, the dismissal was not a termination that would bar a refiling. Regarding the right to a speedy trial, the Court distinguished between delay in trial and delay in refiling. The constitutional right to a speedy trial is violated by inordinate delay after a formal indictment has been made and the accused has been held to answer. The nearly seven-year interval between the provisional dismissal and the refiling was a period where there was no pending case or active prosecution. The right cannot be invoked for delay occurring between a provisional dismissal and a subsequent refiling, as the State retains the prerogative to refile within a reasonable time, absent statutory limits. The Court found no grave abuse of discretion in the respondent judge’s denial of the motion to quash.