GR L 45376; (July, 1988) (Digest)
G.R. Nos. L-45376-77 July 26, 1988
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. RODOLFO B. ALBANO, in his capacity as Judge of Circuit Criminal Court, 16th Judicial District, Davao City and City Mayor ANTONIO C. ACHARON & ROSALINA BERNABE, respondents.
FACTS
Two separate informations were filed against respondents. In Criminal Case No. 255, City Mayor Antonio C. Acharon was charged with violating paragraphs (e) and (f), Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019). The information alleged that in 1968, he unlawfully denied Emilio Evangelista’s application for a cockpit license renewal and instead issued a license to his uncle, Luis Acharon, thereby causing undue injury and giving unwarranted preference to a relative. In Criminal Case No. 256, both Mayor Acharon and Vice-Mayor Rosalina Bernabe were charged for conspiring to fraudulently procure 1,635 sacks of rice from the Rice & Corn Administration in 1969 using city employees’ names, purchasing them at a lower government price, and illegally reselling them for personal gain. The prosecution filed an urgent motion to suspend the accused from office pending trial.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal cases on the ground that the informations were “invalid ab initio” without first conducting the mandatory pre-suspension hearing required under Section 13 of R.A. 3019.
RULING
Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition, annulled the trial court’s dismissal orders, and remanded the cases for further proceedings. The Court held that the trial judge committed grave abuse of discretion. Under Section 13 of R.A. 3019, upon the filing of a valid information, the court is mandated to immediately suspend the accused public officer from office. A pre-suspension hearing is required, but its scope is limited solely to determining the validity of the information—specifically, whether it alleges facts constituting the offense charged and whether the accused is the public officer referred to in the law. The trial court exceeded this limited jurisdiction. It erroneously dismissed the cases by delving into the ultimate merits and sufficiency of evidence, declaring the informations “invalid ab initio” based on its assessment of the evidence, which is a matter for trial proper. The informations, on their face, sufficiently alleged the essential elements of violations under R.A. 3019. The mandatory suspension procedure is a preliminary step distinct from the trial on the merits. By dismissing the cases without confining the pre-suspension hearing to its proper limited purpose, the court deprived the prosecution of its right to prove its case during trial. The orders of dismissal were therefore issued without jurisdiction.
