FACTS:
On July 27, 1907, Bonifacio Pobre, a municipal counselor, was charged with violating Act No. 1461 for possessing opium and an instrument for its use in his house on or prior to July 26, 1907, without legal authorization. Pobre pleaded not guilty. During the trial, but before any evidence was formally adduced, the provincial fiscal and Pobre‘s counsel entered into an agreement. They stipulated what their respective witnesses would testify: the prosecution’s witnesses would confirm the complaint, while the defense witnesses would state that the “opium” was actually ashes and that if found, it was left by an authorized Chinaman named Quin-quio, and that Pobre‘s neighbors would attest he was not an opium smoker. Based solely on this agreement, the parties requested judgment. The lower court, on December 7, 1907, sentenced Pobre to pay a fine of P15, costs, and ordered the confiscation of the articles. Pobre appealed this judgment.

ISSUE:
Can a judgment in a criminal case be rendered solely on the basis of an agreement between the prosecution and defense counsel regarding what their respective witnesses would testify, without the actual presentation of evidence or the taking of testimony?

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court, in G.R. No. 4537 on August 1, 1908, ruled that the practice of rendering judgment based merely on an agreement between the fiscal and the defense counsel as to what witnesses would testify, without any evidence being adduced or testimony taken, is unauthorized. Such a practice defeats the purpose of criminal law and constitutes an open violation of the rules of criminal procedure, particularly Section 32 of General Orders No. 58. Citing the precedent in U.S. vs. Donato, the Court declared the judgment appealed from as null and void. The judgment was set aside, and the case was remanded to the lower court for a new trial to be conducted in strict accordance with the provisions of the law of procedure.