G.R. No. L-45262, L-45394, and 73241-42. July 23, 1990.
Ruperto Reyes and Reynaldo C. San Juan, et al., petitioners, vs. Hon. Lorenzo R. Mosqueda, Judge of CFI, Pampanga (Branch VII), and Ursula D. Pascual, respondents. Pedro Dalusong, petitioner, vs. Hon. Lorenzo R. Mosqueda, Judge, et al., respondents. Ofelia D. Parungao and Rosario Duncil, petitioners, vs. The Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., respondents.

FACTS

Dr. Emilio Pascual died intestate. Special proceedings for his estate were initiated. Respondent Ursula Pascual, the decedent’s sister, moved to exclude certain properties from the estate’s inventory, claiming they were covered by a “Donation Mortis Causa” executed in her favor by Dr. Pascual in 1966. The trial court granted her motion in an Order dated August 1, 1976, excluding the properties pending final determination in a separate action. This Order is challenged in G.R. Nos. 45262 and 45394.
Among the disputed properties was a Tondo lot. It was later revealed that Dr. Pascual had also executed a 1969 deed of donation inter vivos over the same lot in favor of petitioner Ofelia Parungao. After Dr. Pascual’s death, Ursula sold the lot to the Reyeses (private respondents in G.R. Nos. 73241-42). Parungao, upon discovering the title missing, secured a reconstituted title in her name. This led to two consolidated civil cases for annulment of title and recovery of possession between Parungao and the Reyeses. The trial court and the Intermediate Appellate Court ruled against Parungao, declaring her title void and dismissing her complaint. Her petition to this Court was initially denied.

ISSUE

The core issue, common to the consolidated petitions, is the correct legal nature of the 1966 instrument in favor of Ursula Pascual: is it a revocable donation mortis causa (testamentary in character) or an irrevocable donation inter vivos?

RULING

The Court ruled that the 1966 instrument is a donation inter vivos, not mortis causa. The legal logic hinges on the donor’s intent, ascertained from the deed’s terms and the nature of the disposition. A donation mortis causa is essentially a testamentary disposition, taking effect only upon the donor’s death and characterized by: (1) the retention of ownership and control by the donor during his lifetime; (2) revocability at the donor’s will; and (3) the condition that the transfer is void if the donor survives the donee.
Applying these principles, the Court found the 1966 donation contained none of these characteristics. The transfer of ownership to Ursula was immediate and independent of Dr. Pascual’s death. The deed was executed out of love, affection, and gratitude for services rendered. The provision reserving some properties for the donor’s subsistence merely confirmed that naked ownership passed to the donee immediately upon execution, with the donor retaining only a usufructuary interest for his support. Consequently, the properties rightfully belonged to Ursula Pascual upon execution and were correctly excluded from the estate inventory. This finding also validates the subsequent sale to the Reyeses and sustains the appellate decisions against Parungao, whose later donation concerned property already validly transferred. The petitions were denied.