G.R. No. L-452, July 30, 1946
Felisa A. Tarnate, petitioner, vs. Inigo S. Daza, Judge of First Instance of Batangas, and Ramon A. Tarnate, respondents.

FACTS

In 1937, the intestate estate proceedings of Paula Agoncillo (Civil Case No. 3308) commenced in the Court of First Instance of Batangas. On September 7, 1942, Ramon Tarnate filed a separate action (Civil Case No. 2) against Felisa A. Tarnate, claiming sole ownership over Lot No. 13, part of the Agoncillo estate. The trial court ruled against Ramon on July 19, 1944, and he appealed to the Court of Appeals. The records of this appeal were lost or destroyed during the reconquest of the Philippines. On December 2, 1945, Felisa, as administratrix of the Agoncillo estate, filed a project of partition in the estate proceedings (Case No. 3308) that included Lot No. 13. Ramon opposed this, arguing that the ownership dispute was still pending on appeal and that he would seek reconstitution of the lost records. The probate court, on January 4, 1946, sustained the opposition but gave Ramon 30 days to inform the court of the records’ whereabouts or file a revived action; otherwise, the partition would be approved. Accordingly, on February 6, 1946, Ramon filed a new complaint (Civil Case No. 4010) before the same Court of First Instance, reviving his claim over Lot No. 13. Felisa moved to dismiss this new case, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because a prior action on the same subject matter and between the same parties was still pending before the Court of Appeals (referring to the appealed Civil Case No. 2). The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and the subsequent motion for reconsideration. Felisa then filed this petition for certiorari seeking to annul the proceedings in Civil Case No. 4010.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 4010 on the ground of the pendency of another action (lis pendens).

RULING

The petition for certiorari is dismissed. The Supreme Court held that the trial court had jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 4010. In a petition for certiorari, only questions of jurisdiction may generally be raised. The pendency of another action (lis pendens) is a ground for dismissal under the Rules of Court, but it is distinct from and does not affect the court’s jurisdiction over a case. The trial court acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the parties through the filing of the complaint and service of summons. It also had jurisdiction over the subject matter, which was the ownership of a parcel of land, pursuant to its general jurisdiction under Act No. 136. Therefore, the trial court had the power to try and decide the case validly, and the alleged pendency of another action could not divest it of that jurisdiction.
Separate Concurring Opinion (Briones, J., with whom Paras, J., concurs):
The concurring opinion adds that the record shows the destroyed or lost records of the first case appealed to the Court of Appeals could no longer be reconstituted, as the copies held by the appellant (Ramon) were also lost. The appellee (Felisa), who had won the first case, could have had an interest in reconstitution but took no steps to do so. Therefore, the allegation of a pending prior action is entirely without foundation. Consequently, there is neither a lack of jurisdiction by the lower court over the second suit nor a prohibited multiplicity of suits. The second complaint was properly filed under Act No. 3110 regarding the reconstitution of destroyed or lost records.