G.R. No. L-45137. September 23, 1985
FE J. BAUTISTA and MILAGROS J. CORPUS, petitioners, vs. HON. MALCOLM G. SARMIENTO, District Judge, Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch I and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioners Fe Bautista and Milagros Corpus, along with Teresita Vergere, were charged with estafa before the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. The information alleged they received jewelry from Dr. Leticia C. Yap on a consignment or commission basis, obligating them to return the items or remit the proceeds of sale, which they failed to do despite demand. After the prosecution rested its case, having presented only the private complainant as witness, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss in the nature of a demurrer to evidence. They argued the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, contending the transaction was a sale, not an agency, and that no prior demand was established.
Respondent Judge Malcolm G. Sarmiento denied the motion in an Order dated June 3, 1976. The court found the information clearly alleged a consignment agreement, and the prosecution’s evidence, including a demand letter, had established a prima facie case. The order directed petitioners to present their evidence. Their motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting them to file this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, assailing the denial as a grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE

Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioners’ demurrer to evidence and in ordering them to present their defense.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion. The Court first noted that a petition for certiorari is generally an improper remedy against an interlocutory order like the denial of a demurrer to evidence; the ordinary course is to proceed to trial and raise the issue on appeal. While an exception exists for oppressive exercises of authority, no such arbitrariness was present here.
The Court clarified the legal implications of a prima facie case. Petitioners erroneously argued that a finding of a prima facie case was insufficient for a denial, as conviction requires proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Court explained that when a prima facie case is established by the prosecution, it does not shift the burden of proof, which remains with the prosecution throughout. However, it does shift the burden of evidence to the defense. The accused must then adduce evidence to meet, nullify, or overthrow the prosecution’s prima facie case. The defense evidence need only balance the prosecution’s evidence to shift the burden of evidence back. By refusing to present evidence after their demurrer was denied, petitioners justified an inference of guilt, as they failed to discharge this shifted burden of evidence.
Furthermore, the order for petitioners to present their evidence was correct and in line with procedural law. As held in Arbriol vs. Homeres, if a motion to dismiss (demurrer) is denied, the court must proceed to hear the defense’s evidence, as it is the constitutional right of the accused to be heard. The court does not rely on the defense’s weakness but ensures the accused’s right to present evidence before judgment. The respondent judge’s orders were therefore well-taken and within his judicial authority.