G.R. L-No. 4507
MACARIA MANUEL, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. FRIDOLIN WIGETT, ET AL., defendants. FRIDOLIN WIGETT, appellant.
August 18, 1909

FACTS:
Jose Mas was appointed administrator of the estate of Francisca Hilario, with Fridolin Wigett and Felipe Calderon as sureties on his bond (initially P2,000, later increased to P10,000). Mas was subsequently relieved, and Roberto Moreno was appointed as the new administrator.

Previously, the trial court had ordered Calderon, who served as legal adviser to Mas, to deposit P10,514.14 (funds paid to him by Mas) into court, finding that he was unlawfully detaining this amount. Calderon refused, claiming the amount as fees for services, and appealed the trial court’s subsequent order holding him in contempt for non-compliance.

While Calderon’s appeal was still pending, the new administrator Moreno and the heirs of the estate filed a petition asking the court to require the former administrator Mas and his bondsmen (Wigett and Calderon) to pay over certain funds of the estate allegedly unlawfully retained by Mas. The trial court granted this petition, ordering Mas to deposit or pay P10,973.43 (including the P10,514.14 at the center of Calderon’s appeal) to Moreno, and in the event of failure, judgment would be entered against Mas and his sureties (Wigett and Calderon) for P10,000.

Fridolin Wigett, as surety, appealed this order. His sole assigned error was the trial court’s failure to dismiss the petition, arguing that there was “another action pending” (Calderon’s appeal) between the same parties for the same cause, as provided for in Sections 91 and 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

ISSUE:
Did the trial court err in refusing to dismiss the petition against the former administrator Mas and his sureties (including Wigett) on the ground of “another action pending,” given that one of the sureties, Calderon, had an ongoing appeal concerning a portion of the funds in question?

RULING:
No. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that the plea of “another action pending” (auter action pendant) was not applicable.

The Court held that for the plea of “another action pending” to succeed, there must be an identity of parties, identity of cause of action, and the relief sought must be such that if the pending case had already been disposed of, it could be pleaded in bar as a former adjudication of the same matter between the same parties. Applying these criteria to the case at hand:

1. Identity of Parties: While the plaintiffs (heirs/estate) were essentially the same, the defendants were not. The first proceeding (Calderon’s appeal) involved Calderon as the sole defendant regarding his personal retention of funds. The second proceeding involved Mas as the principal defendant (administrator) and Wigett and Calderon as his sureties, with Calderon’s liability in this context being merely subsidiary to and dependent on Mas’s liability.
2. Identity of Cause of Action/Relief Sought: The causes of action and the relief sought were distinct. The first proceeding concerned Calderon’s right to take, hold, and pay himself out of estate funds for alleged professional services without court adjudication. The second proceeding aimed to determine the amount of Mas’s liability as administrator to the estate and the subsidiary liability of his sureties. The relief sought in the second suit (fixing liability upon Mas and subsidiarily upon his sureties) was more extensive than what could have been obtained in the first.
3. Res Judicata Efficacy: An adjudication in Calderon’s appeal would not bind Mas, who was not a party to that proceeding. Even if Calderon were ordered to pay, Mas and his bondsmen would still be responsible if Calderon failed or was unable to comply with the court’s order.

The Court emphasized that merely having a close connection between the subject matter or requiring the decision of the same questions exactly is not enough to warrant dismissal based on “another action pending.” The nature of the remedies, the character of the relief sought, and the identity of the parties in the different suits must be considered.

Therefore, the trial court properly disregarded the plea of “another action pending.” The order of the lower court was affirmed.