G.R. No. L-44973. November 4, 1985. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ERNESTO SANTOS Y CRUZ, accused-appellant.
FACTS

The accused-appellant, Ernesto Santos y Cruz, was charged with the rape of ten-year-old Erlita Francisco. The information alleged that on July 21, 1976, in Antipolo, Rizal, the accused, an escapee from the Davao Penal Colony, by means of force, intimidation, and at knifepoint, succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the victim. Upon arraignment, the accused, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded guilty. Nonetheless, the trial court proceeded to receive evidence, which conclusively established the commission of the crime, including the victim’s age and the use of a deadly weapon.
The trial court found the accused guilty and, applying Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, noted the imposable penalty was reclusion perpetua to death. However, the court imposed the supreme penalty of death. It justified this by applying Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code on quasi-recidivism, reasoning that the accused committed the felony “while serving” a sentence as he was an escapee from the Davao Penal Colony at the time of the rape.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court correctly applied Article 160 (quasi-recidivism) of the Revised Penal Code to impose the death penalty on the accused.

RULING

No, the trial court erred in applying Article 160. The Supreme Court modified the penalty to reclusion perpetua. The legal logic is clear: Article 160 imposes the maximum period of the penalty for a new felony if committed by a person “after having been convicted by final judgment, before beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving the same.” The provision has a strict condition sine qua non: there must be proof of a prior conviction by final judgment. In this case, the sole basis for invoking quasi-recidivism was the allegation in the information and the evidence that the accused was an “escapee from Davao Penal Colony.” The Court ruled this fact alone is insufficient to prove a final conviction. An individual in a penal colony could be a detention prisoner awaiting final judgment, not a convict serving a sentence by final judgment. The record contained no documentary evidence, such as a judgment of conviction, to satisfy this indispensable requirement. Consequently, the aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism was improperly considered. With the accused’s plea of guilty to a crime where the penalty was reclusion perpetua to death, and in the absence of any other aggravating circumstance, the correct penalty is the lesser one of reclusion perpetua. The Court also increased the civil indemnity to P20,000.00.