G.R. No. L-44972 March 15, 1982
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RODRIGO MARTIJA Y MACEDA, accused-appellant.

FACTS

The accused, Rodrigo Martija y Maceda, was charged with murder for hacking Josefino Cruz to death on July 25, 1976, in Quezon City. The prosecution evidence, through witness Leonardo Angeles, established that the victim was standing at a store when Martija, without any prior altercation, attacked him from behind with a bolo, inflicting ten wounds, six of which were fatal. The victim died before reaching the hospital.
The accused claimed self-defense, testifying that the victim, allegedly a gang member, chased him with a bolo. He stated he was able to grab the weapon and hack the deceased in retaliation. He surrendered to police authorities on the same evening. The trial court rejected this defense, finding his testimony unnatural and uncorroborated, and convicted him of murder qualified by treachery, imposing the death penalty.

ISSUE

The core issues for automatic review were: (1) whether the trial court correctly rejected the plea of self-defense, and (2) whether the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was present to warrant a reduction of the penalty from death.

RULING

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but modified the penalty. The Court upheld the trial court’s rejection of self-defense. The legal logic is that one who invokes self-defense admits the killing and must prove by clear and convincing evidence the concurrence of unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed, and lack of sufficient provocation. Here, the accused failed to prove unlawful aggression. His own narrative indicated the alleged aggressor had already fallen face down before the hacking began, negating any continuing peril. Furthermore, the nature and number of wounds—ten hacking wounds, including fatal injuries to the back—were grossly disproportionate to any defensive need, indicating a determined effort to kill. His uncorroborated testimony was also deemed inherently doubtful.
However, the Court found the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was duly established, as the accused surrendered to the police on the night of the crime without any compulsion. With this sole mitigating circumstance and no aggravating circumstances, the prescribed penalty for murder (reclusion temporal maximum to death) should be imposed at its minimum period. Thus, the death penalty was improper. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court modified the penalty to an indeterminate sentence of ten years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to twenty years of reclusion temporal as maximum.