G.R. No. L-44823. June 27, 1985.
VICENTE OUANO (Deceased) Substituted by Querina Arraz Ouano and Vicente Arraz Ouano, Jr., Anna Loraine Ouano, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and HON. RAFAEL T. MENDOZA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, FE JUSTINIANA ESPINA CABRERA, CRISTOBAL, CESAR, ISIDRO, FULGENCIO ROLANDO, EDIPOLO, LILIAN, EDILBERTO, RAYMUNDO and LUCIA, all surnamed ESPINA and ARSENIO OUANO, respondents.

FACTS

Petitioner Vicente Ouano filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Cebu to recover his late mother’s paraphernal property. After the trial court dismissed his complaint, he was granted leave to appeal as a pauper litigant. However, he failed to file a record on appeal. The private respondents moved to dismiss the appeal for this failure, and the trial court granted the motion, disallowing the appeal. Ouano then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of Appeals, arguing that as a pauper litigant, he was exempt from filing a separate record on appeal under Section 16, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. The appellate court dismissed his petition. Ouano elevated the case to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari, also filed in forma pauperis. During the pendency of the case, petitioner Vicente Ouano died and was substituted by his surviving spouse and minor children.

ISSUE

The sole issue is whether a party litigant permitted to appeal as a pauper is exempt from filing a record on appeal.

RULING

The Supreme Court set aside the appellate court’s decision and directed the elevation of the entire record for appeal. The legal logic proceeds in two steps. First, the Court clarified the procedural rule applicable at the time of the trial court’s dismissal. Citing Section 16 of Rule 41 together with Section 22 of Rule 3, and its precedent in Toribio vs. Bidin, the Court held that a pauper litigant was not exempt from filing a record on appeal; the exemption was only from filing a printed record on appeal. A pauper litigant was still required to submit a typewritten or mimeographed record on appeal. Therefore, under the rules then in force, the trial court’s dismissal for non-filing was technically correct. Second, and decisively, the Court applied a subsequent procedural change retroactively. The Court noted that under Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act) and Section 18 of the Interim Rules, the requirement for a record on appeal had been eliminated for ordinary appeals. As procedural rules aimed at ensuring a just and speedy disposition of cases, these new provisions have retroactive effect. Consequently, the Court ruled that to grant the pauper litigants their fullest day in court, and in light of the new procedural regime, the appeal should be allowed to proceed by simply elevating the entire original record of the case.