GR L 4463; (October, 1908) (Digest)
G.R. No. L-4463
October 6, 1908
LUIS R. YANGCO, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARSENIO CRUZ HERRERA AND SERAFIN WY PIACO, defendants-appellants.
FACTS:
On March 16, 1904, defendant Herrera borrowed P10,000 from plaintiff Yangco, which later increased to P25,000. As security, Herrera mortgaged two parcels of real estate. The mortgage deeds included a clause stating: “By agreement with the agent of the creditor I fix as the value of the aforesaid property the sum of 45,000 Philippine pesos, which sum shall serve as tipo (upset price) at the only auction which shall be held, in case the creditor is obliged to enforce his claim, hereby waiving any other valuation and any action which might be available to me to that end.” Defendant Serafin Wy Piaco was included in the foreclosure as a subsequent purchaser of one of the parcels. The Court of First Instance of Manila ordered the foreclosure and sale of the real estate without referencing the aforementioned clause. Herrera appealed, contending that the “tipo” clause should have been given effect.
ISSUE:
Can a clause in a mortgage contract, fixing an upset price (“tipo”) and limiting the sale to “only one auction,” override or alter the procedural rules for foreclosure sales as prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure?
RULING:
No. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of First Instance, holding that the “tipo” clause in the mortgage cannot alter the procedure for foreclosure sales laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure.
The Court reasoned that such a stipulation essentially varies the statutory procedure by:
1. Limiting the sale to only one auction, despite the court’s discretion to order resales.
2. Contravening the statutory direction that the property be sold to the highest bidder.
3. Potentially leading to procedural impasses (e.g., futile resales or a blockade of procedure if the mortgagee fails to bid the stipulated “tipo”) that are incompatible with the Code’s requirement for a final disposition of the property.
The Court emphasized that while parties can agree on substantive rights, they cannot, by private agreement, interfere with or dictate adjective rights or methods of procedure in the courts, which are already regulated by law and are beyond their control. Although parties may agree that a mortgagee will compensate the mortgagor for any difference between an agreed valuation and the sale price, or personally obligate themselves to bid a certain price, these agreements cannot disrupt the established court procedures.
